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In this dissertation, the focus is on taxes, employment growth, and firm behavior 
in Uganda. Chapter 1 studies the relationship between corporate effective tax rates and 
firm size, where firm size is measured by a firm’s gross income in a given fiscal year. In 
the past two decades, the debate on how high corporate tax rates should be has dominated 
tax policy discussions in developing countries. However, corporate tax rates do not 
reflect the true burden of a tax since they ignore the effect of allowable deductions, which 
are captured in effective tax rates. The corporate tax rate in Uganda is a flat rate of 30 
percent. In theory, every firm regardless of size should pay the same rate. However, the 
effective tax rates differ from the stated tax rate because of the differences in the ability 
of firms to minimize their tax liability. There are two competing theories on how the 
effective tax rate changes with firm size – the political power theory favoring lower taxes 





After accounting for structural differences of firms, such as profits for tax purposes, the 
nature of their economic activity, and other time-invariant characteristics, within-firm 
variation is used to estimate the effect of firm size on effective tax rates. The results 
reveal a negative effect of firm size on effective tax rates, which implies that the largest 
firms shoulder a lower burden of the tax relative to smaller firms. This negative effect is 
robust to correction for outliers, and it persists when allocation to the large or the medium 
taxpayers’ offices are used as instruments for firm size. In addition, there is evidence that 
supports a non-linear relationship between firm size and the effective tax rate; the effect 
is quite steeply negative for small firms but mostly flat in the middle range, and then 
becomes negative again for large firms.  
Chapter 2 focuses on estimating the impact of increases in excise tax rates on 
firms’ sales revenue, firm profits, and government excise tax revenue in Uganda. In the 
quest to raise sufficient tax revenue, tax policy changes in most developing countries tend 
to increase tax rates instead of simplifying the tax system. Increases in tax rates tend to 
have costs that are unintentionally ignored by policymakers. In this chapter, tax returns 
data for four financial years are used to estimate the effect of changes in excise tax rates 
on specific goods (motor vehicle lubricants, fuels, confectionaries, cigarettes, beer, wine, 
and furniture) on firms’ reported sales revenue and profits – the two outcome variables. 
While allowing for non-parallel linear trends, the effect of the change in excise tax rates 
is estimated by comparing outcome variables of treated firms to those of the comparison 
group. The results suggest that the sales revenue for treated firms decreased by 11 percent 





comparison group firms. Firms’ profits for treated firms also decrease on average, by 27 
percent in the years post-tax change. Given the decreases in sales revenues and profits, 
the evidence in Chapter 2 suggests that government tax revenues from treated products 
significantly decreased by 83 percent relative to excisables whose tax rates were not 
changed. The findings in this chapter suggest that excise tax rates in Uganda may have 
been increased to rates that are far above what is optimal; any further increases in such 
rates may not result in any increases in government revenue, but rather have detrimental 
effects on firms’ sales revenues and profits. 
Chapter 3 investigates how formal employment growth varies by firm size – firm 
size is measured by quintiles of total employee compensation. In many developing 
countries, tax and industrial development policies tend to be geared towards ensuring that 
small and medium enterprises survive long enough to grow and become relatively large 
companies. However, little is known about how employment growth rates vary with firm 
size as measured by quintiles of total employee compensation and age. Using business 
income tax returns data from Uganda, this paper presents ordinary least squares estimates 
to investigate how employment growth varies with firm size and age. The main findings 
suggest that, contrary to what has been found for U.S. firms, employment growth 
increases with firm size in Uganda even after controlling for firm age and other firm-
specific characteristics. In addition, these patterns are also observed in specific sectors, 
such as construction, wholesale and retail trade, finance and insurance, and 
accommodation and food services. Finally, large young firms create the most formal 





growth increases because the large young firms create more jobs than they destroy. These 
findings are robust to the use of other sources of data that include both formal and 
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Chapter 1  
 




















Governments in developing countries often choose their tax policies not only to 
raise revenue for public expenditures but also to generate incentives for savings and 
investment. In designing tax policies to attain these objectives, it is important to 
appreciate that the economy grows much faster when there is minimal interference from a 
tax system (Reed, 2008). Providing incentives in the form of “generous” allowable 
deductions creates discrepancies in a tax system. Even when tax incentives are available 
to all firms, they could be used differently by firms of different sizes, hence generating 




Uganda has a corporate income tax, and corporations are subject to this tax on 
both their domestic and their foreign income at a rate of 30 percent, regardless of their 
size. Corporations are allowed to deduct from their taxable income expenses incurred in 
generating that income, and they also receive a tax credit for taxes paid in other tax 
jurisdictions. Nonresident corporations are subject to the same taxation regime on the 
portion of their income earned in Uganda. In addition to the expenses incurred in 
generating income, corporations (both resident and non-resident) are also allowed to 
deduct depreciation and interest expenses, and expensing is also allowed for purchases of 
low-value assets. Finally, all firms are allowed to carry forward indefinitely their losses, 
and agro processors and exporters of finished products are generally exempt from the 
                                                          
1
 Average corporate effective tax rates are defined as the share of firms’ gross/accounting profits spent on 







 The generous deductions and exemptions from this tax are used 
differently by firms of different size, which results in different effective tax rates by firm 
size. In this chapter, I therefore, estimate the effect of firm size, measured by gross 
income, on effective tax rates in Uganda and comment on the level of progressivity in 
firms’ gross income of Uganda’s corporate income tax.  
             
In the last two decades, developing economies have either come under pressure 
from multinational corporations to reduce corporate tax rates or tried to encourage new 
investment by providing generous deductions and exemptions from that tax (Keen and 
Simone, 2004). Such exemptions may attract new investments to places that otherwise 
would be unattractive to investors, but they also make the tax system less efficient and 
more complex to implement. In addition, they cause disparities in effective tax rates. The 
disparities arise because of the differences in firms’ ability to exploit tax deductions and 
exemptions. For example, even though large firms with high tax liability attract scrutiny 
from tax administrators (Zimmerman, 1983), they are also more likely to hire tax 
planners to lower their liability (Siegfried, 1974; Becker, 1983; Mascagni and Mengistu, 
2017; Carreras et al. 2017; Stickney and McGee, 1982; Stigler, 1971). In contrast, smaller 
firms with fewer resources available to exploit tax preferences are likely to face a higher 
effective tax rate.  
 
                                                          
2
 The provisions that exempt firms and provide for the deductions are clearly stipulated in Uganda’s 





The variability in effective tax rates reflects disparities in the ability of firms to 
exploit ambiguities in the tax law, weaknesses in tax administration, and limited access to 
tax information by smaller firms. The findings in this chapter, therefore, generate 
evidence that will aid policymakers in Uganda and other developing countries to improve 
their tax systems. In particular, the tax system should not be designed to place small firms 
at a tax disadvantage. The large informal sector in most developing countries may force 
the tax authority to deny “legitimate” expenses by formal firms that trade with informal 
firms because of lack of third party information. This leads to a high effective tax rate on 
such firms. When designing tax systems, policymakers should consider the structural 
challenges that firms face, and develop targeted tax information programs aimed at 
making taxes less of a burden on firms. 
         
The debate on effective tax rates and firm size dates back to the early 1980s, when 
the Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) demonstrated that the corporate effective tax rates were 
not fairly distributed in the United States, which influenced the 1986 Tax Reform Act; 
this led to a significant increase in government revenue in the United States (Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997). However, analyzing the relationship between effective tax rates and 
firm size was limited to the United States until the late 1990s and early 2000s, when other 
countries also started exploring this relationship. Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) explored 
the relationship for countries in Asia (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Korean, Taiwan, and 





direction of the relationship depended on the choice of the method used to measure the 
effective tax rate. Richardson and Lanis (2007) found that firm size does matter in 
determining effective tax rates in Australia. In contrast, Nicodème (2007) used the 
number of employees as a measure of firm size for 21 European countries and found a 
negative relationship. On the other hand, Lazar (2014) found that firm size does not 
matter for Romania’s nonfinancial Bucharest Stock Exchange listed companies.  
 
In contrast, the literature from developing countries is very rare, largely because 
of limited access to useable tax data, which speaks to the importance of the findings in 
this chapter. After taking into account structural differences of firms, such as profits for 
tax purposes, the nature of economic activity, and other time invariant characteristics, this 
study uses within-firm variation to estimate the effect of firm size on effective tax rates. 
The analysis unveils a negative effect of firm size on effective tax rates for Ugandan 
corporations; this result is robust to adjustments for outliers, and it persists when 
assignment to the large or the medium taxpayers’ office are used as an instrument for 
firm size.  
 
In addition, there is evidence that supports a non-linear effect; this effect is 
steeply negative for small firms but mostly flat in the middle range, and then becomes 
negative again for large firms. This evidence contributes to the scarce literature on 





and other developing countries think more about how their tax policies translate into the 
corporate tax burden. The findings also contribute to the policy discussion of how high 
corporate tax rates should be in developing countries. Specifically, Uganda has a 
corporate income tax rate of 30 percent, but this rate does not reflect the true burden of a 
tax. The effective corporate tax rate is in fact as low as 6 percent. Reducing the corporate 
tax rate without any changes to allowable deductions will lead to a significant loss in 
government revenue.   
 
Gauthier and Reinikka (2006) investigated the impact of tax reforms implemented 
in Uganda in the mid-1990s, and how they could have affected the distribution of the tax 
burden. They base their analysis on survey data collected from 243 firms, and they find 
that tax exemptions in the mid-1990s benefitted large businesses disproportionately and 
that medium-sized firms shouldered a higher tax burden. However, the Ugandan 
economy has evolved considerably since the mid-1990s, and so has the tax system. In 
particular, the Uganda Revenue Authority has fully transitioned into a “semi-
autonomous” body, there has been a transition from paper-based tax returns to electronic 
filing, and exemptions have been streamlined, although not totally eliminated. Indeed, as 
will be seen below, the findings in this chapter differ from those of Gauthier and 






Contrary to the findings of Gauthier and Reinikka (2006), Mascagni and Mengistu 
(2017) and Carreras et al. (2017) provide evidence, from Ethiopia and South Africa, 
respectively, that suggests a U-shaped relationship between the effective tax rate and firm 
size, which implies that medium-sized firms bear a disproportionately low tax burden as 
compared to smaller and larger firms. These results are somewhat consistent with the 
findings in this chapter for small and medium-sized firms, the exception being that as 
firms get much larger the effect continues to be negative.  
Other developing country evidence suggests that political connections play a significant 
role in determining effective tax rates (Adhikari et al., 2006), which is consistent with the 
thought that larger firms are likely to have more political connections, which they exploit 
(Stigler, 1971; Becker, 1983) to persuade policymakers to design tax legislation in their 
favor. Unfortunately, the effect of political connections is not explored in this chapter due 
to data limitations.  
 
Corruption in tax administration cannot be disentangled from the relationship 
between effective tax rates and firm size, since bribery can lead to misreporting of 
income and related expenses, which can lead to measurement error problems. In response 
to these problems, developing countries in both Africa and Latin America have created 
“semi-autonomous” revenue authorities in order to free tax authorities from the stringent 
rules of public service and to minimize political interference in the day to day operations 





The “semi-autonomous” status of these agencies allows them to pay high wages 
to mitigate bribery, but evidence from Tanzania suggests that corruption will still thrive 
with higher wages and better working conditions without extensive and proper 
monitoring (Fjeldstad, 2005, 2003). In the presence of corruption, effective tax rates will 
be relatively low since firms can bribe tax administrators and get lower assessments or 
even pay tax administrators to avoid heavy penalties; this compromises firm growth and 
adds to the inefficiencies already created by taxation. Corruption in tax administration 
can also introduce measurement error in firms’ gross income, which could lead to biased 
estimates.. To minimize this problem, this chapter uses assignment to the large or the 
medium taxpayers’ office as instruments for gross income to reduce bias due to 
measurement error.  
 
Finally, the focus on Uganda is driven by the availability of a non-public tax 
administration panel dataset and the need to generate evidence to contribute to the limited 
literature on empirical taxation in developing countries. The remaining sections of this 
chapter are organized as follows; Section 1.2 provides a conceptual framework; Section 
1.3 discusses the empirical framework; Section 1.4 describes the data; Section 1.5 reports 






1.2 Conceptual Framework  
There are two “main” hypotheses on the relationship between effective tax rates 
and firm size. The first hypothesis, proposed by Siegfried (1974), suggests that large 
firms have resources to influence political decisions in their favor and to hire tax experts 
who aide with tax planning, and hence are likely to face low effective tax rates. This is 
called the political power theory. Smaller firms, on the other hand, are resource-
constrained and are likely to face high effective tax rates. The second hypothesis, 
proposed by Zimmerman (1983), suggests that large and successful firms are visible and 
will be subject to more scrutiny and regulation from tax administrators, hence they are 
likely to face high effective tax rates. This is known as the political cost theory.  
 
To sharpen the discussion, the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) is defined as the ratio of 
Corporate Income Tax payments (CIT) over gross profits (π). Both of these variables are 
functions of gross income/receipts (x), which will be used as the measure of firm size, 
and the expenses incurred in generating that income.  
Thus   
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With some simplification, equation (1.1) can be expressed as  
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where   
      
       
    
 are elasticities that capture the responsiveness of corporate 
income tax payments and gross profits, respectively, to changes in firm size (gross 
income/receipts). 
 
Firms with positive profits but zero corporate income tax payments (firms exempt 
from the corporate tax by law) bear no corporate tax burden and for this reason they are 
excluded from the analysis. It is clear from equation       that firm size will have a 
positive effect on ETR if    
      
   
         which implies that larger firms are more 
visible, subject to more scrutiny from tax authorities, and likely to pay more in tax 
revenue. On the other hand, the effect is negative if     
      
   
       ; this implies 
that larger firms have the ability to under-report their profits or hire tax planners to 
minimize their tax liability, hence they are likely to face a lower tax burden. Clearly, 
there are two competing pressures, one that favors lower rates, and the other higher rates, 
for larger firms; the overall effect, therefore, depends on which effect is stronger, which 
cannot be determined by theory but rather is an empirical question. The next section 





1.3 Empirical Framework 
The effect of firm size on effective tax rates is estimated using a firm fixed-effects 
specification. The log of the effective tax rate is regressed on the log of gross 
income/receipts. Time-variant determinants of effective tax rates and firm fixed effects 
are then added to control for firm specific time-invariant characteristics. In addition, year-
specific dummy variables are added to control for variables that change over time but 
affect all firms in the same way with respect to their taxes, such as changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. Evidence on the effect of firm size on effective tax rates 
from developing countries suggests a non-linear relationship (Mascagni and Mengistu, 
2017; Carreras et al. 2017; Gauthier and Reinikka, 2006), hence higher-order terms of 
gross income/receipts are added to the extent that they are significant. The estimation 
equation is therefore given by equation (1.4):  
                              
           
    
 
                                     
where; 
    is the effective tax rate for firm i at time t; 
    are year-specific dummy variables;  
    is gross income/receipts for firm i at time t; and   
                of other time-variant determinants of effective tax rates; and  





The variables in      include: depreciation expenses, which captures the capital 
intensity of a firm; financial expenses, which capture a firm’s leverage since interest 
payments are tax deductible while dividends are not; and before-tax profits, which is an 
indicator of firm profitability for tax purposes. If firms can use more allowable 
deductions as they get larger, then the before-tax profits will decrease with size. Except 
for before-tax profits, the coefficients on these other determinants of effective tax rates 
(depreciation and financial expenses) are expected to be negative because they are tax 
deductible expenses, and an increase in the amounts declared will reduce the corporate 
income tax payable, hence lower effective tax rates.  
 
If the variation in effective tax rates is fully explained by the observed ability of 
firms to exploit the allowable deductions, which are denoted by     then firm size should 
not have a significant effect on effective tax rates after adding these controls. However, 
there might be structural challenges that firms of different sizes face. In particular, small 
firms may not have enough collateral to allow them to borrow from formal banks but 
instead rely on quick yet expensive credit provided by informal “money lenders”. Such 
financial expenses may not be deductible by the borrowing small firm for tax purposes 
since the lender cannot be traced by the tax authority, which means that such expenses 
are not part of the financial expenses captured in equation (1.4). If transactions between 





have a significant negative effect on effective tax rates even after controlling for expenses 
and before tax profits. 
 
The outcome variable of interest is the effective tax rate (ETR), which is the share 
of a firm’s accounting/gross profits spent on corporate income tax payments. As 
explained above, this variable is defined as the ratio of corporate income tax 
receipts/payments over accounting/gross profits, as shown in equation (1.1). 
 
The choice of the numerator in equation (1.1) depends on the focus of the study, 
which in this case is the corporate income tax, thus only corporate income tax 
receipts/payments are included in the numerator. The analysis does not include income 
taxes on dividend payments even if some of the dividend recipients are corporations; 
including other taxes in the numerator broadens the research question beyond the scope 
of this study. Similar work done on Ugandan corporations by Gauthier and Reinikka 
(2006) included consumption taxes remitted by firms even if the burden falls directly on 
the consumer. Since the focus in this chapter is on corporate effective tax rates, only 
corporate income tax payments are included in the numerator of equation (1.1). 
 
The choice of the denominator in equation (1.1) is discussed extensively in the 
literature since it may influence the direction of the relationship between ETR and firm 





goods sold, which differs from before-tax profits/chargeable income since the latter does 
not include financial expenses, depreciation allowance, and any investment tax credits  
as the denominator allows for the tax base to include all income before firms exploit the 
allowable deductions, such as interest payments, depreciation allowances and 
amortization of intangible assets (spreading the payment for an asset over time). Hence, 
constructing the ETR in this manner is appropriate for empirical research (Lazar, 2014). 
In addition, allowable deductions and other sources of income vary significantly across 
firms of different sizes: Thus, including all possible income in the denominator generates 
variation in effective tax rates which is essential for estimation.      
 
The explanatory variable of interest is firm size, which is defined by the declared 
corporation’s gross receipts (gross income). In this case, gross receipts also include 
income earned by firms that provide professional services, such as audit, accounting, 
financial and other consultative works that do not involve an actual sale of goods.  
    
As shown in equation (1.4), the estimates in this chapter are based on a firm 
fixed-effects model because it is unrealistic to assume that firm-specific characteristics 
and changes in the macroeconomic environment are uncorrelated (purely random) with 






If there are no other determinants of effective tax rates that are correlated with 
firm size, then estimating equation (1.4) without those variables, which are denoted by 
     would give unbiased estimates. However, variables such as depreciation (which 
captures the capital intensity of a firm, and capital intensive firms are allowed to quickly 
deduct the value of capital before its economic life ends, which provides a tax saving), 
financial expenses (which capture the leverage of a firm, since interest payments are tax 
deductible while dividends are not), and before-tax profits, are correlated with firm size 
and affect effective tax rates. Excluding these variables will lead to omitted variable bias. 
Note that firm fixed-effects will not avoid the problem of omitted variable bias because 
the variables in     change over time.    
 
Uganda’s corporate tax system is based on voluntary compliance, which means 
that firms voluntarily declare their income and the expenses incurred in generating that 
income. This may result in measurement error in the dependent variable of interest. It 
should be noted that measurement error in the dependent variable resulting from under 
declaration of gross profits is not a problem if it is not correlated with the explanatory 
variables of interest. However, this is unlikely because gross profits (the variable in the 
denominator of the dependent variable) are a function of gross income or receipts and the 
expenses incurred in generating that income. Indeed if there is measurement error in 





variable,     which will lead to biased estimates of the impact of firm size, and the bias 
will be towards zero. 
 
It should, however, be noted that tax declarations or returns in Uganda, are by 
law, considered accurate unless a tax audit reveals otherwise. If tax enforcement is very 
strict on firms that underreport, one cannot assert that firms are underreporting their 
accounting profits. What is more likely is that firms are involved in tax planning, which 
suggests tax avoidance “legally”, reducing the tax liability, as opposed to illegally 
underreporting accounting profits. If firms are aggressively involved in tax planning 
(more tax avoidance than evasion) then reported accounting or gross profits are the same 
as actual profits, which may rule out measurement error in both the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variable,    . In addition, allowable deductions are very generous in 
Uganda, which makes it less likely that businesses will underreport their accounting or 
gross profits. What is more likely to happen is that firms will become creative in 
expensing income to minimize their tax liability. If firms in the Small Taxpayers Office 
(STO) indeed underreport their accounting profits, then they would face a lower tax 
burden. However, the effective tax rates may be higher for these small firms because of 
structural challenges, as will be discussed later in the chapter. Firms that underreport their 
accounting profits to stay in the STO, as opposed to being assigned to either the Medium 
or the Large Taxpayers Office (MTO or LTO), to avoid closer scrutiny from the tax 





therefore, is not with measurement error in the dependent variableif there is, and it is 
purely random, then it will not lead to bias. Concerns of measurement error in the 
explanatory variable of interest are addressed in the following paragraphs. 
    
Perhaps the econometric concern is that gross income might be measured with 
error, which if random leads to underestimation of the impact of gross income on the 
effective tax rates. Suppose that measurement error in the explanatory variable of interest, 
    in equation (1.4) is random, then dummy variables that equal 1 if a firm is assigned to 
either the Large or the Medium Taxpayers’ Office (LTO or MTO) can be used as 
instruments for firm size. In addition to the instruments having predictive power for gross 
income (relevant instruments), the other identifying assumption is that the measurement 
error in the assignment of firms to the tax offices is not correlated with the measurement 
error in gross income (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Note that it is preferable to use 
Instrumental Variables (IV) to estimate equation (1.4), but it is not possible because there 
are two instruments, to that effect, the higher order terms are dropped for the IV 
estimates.  
 
Assignment to the large or the medium taxpayers’ office acts as a signal to firms 
that the tax authority is watching, and that should induce firms to report correctly their 
income and the expenses incurred in generating that income. In general, it is difficult for 





dedicated offices to assist taxpayers with their tax concerns has some benefit that is 
appreciated by the business community. The tax authority decides which firms are to be 
allocated to either the Large or the Medium Taxpayers Office (LTO or MTO) and the rest 
of the businesses are part of the Small Taxpayers Office (STO).  
 
The criterion for assigning firms to the tax offices depends on the main activity of 
a firm and gross sales reported by a firm. Sectors that require a large amount of initial 
capital investment that is later claimed as an allowable deduction when the firms start 
generating income (such as extractive industries, and telecommunication companies) are 
mainly classified as large taxpayers even when their gross sales are not at the threshold, 
and these firms cannot in any way misreport their main activity. In addition to the main 
activity, the tax authority sets a gross sales threshold not known to the taxpayers that is 
used to decide which firms are assigned to the LTO or the MTO or stay in the STO. It is 
difficult to manipulate a threshold that is not known. The thresholds are not public 
knowledge and are only known to the tax authorities. The tax authority on the other hand 
keeps a close watch, through regular desk audits, on LTO and MTO firms because they 
are important for tax revenue, which in itself increases the probability of detecting firms 
that were underreporting. Generally, increasing the probability of detection by 
scrutinizing more or showing the intent to scrutinize should influence firms to correctly 
report their income and related expenses (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974; 





The idea here is that assignment to LTO or MTO influences only the way firms 
report their income and related expenses because they are closely monitored by the tax 
authority, which in turn affects effective tax rates. There is no other possible way that 
assignment to LTO or MTO will affect the effective tax rates except by influencing the 
way firms report their incomes and related expenses. The treatment effect is assumed to 
be the same for all firms (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).  Note that the Instrumental 
Variables approach will not reduce bias due to any measurement error that is not random. 
Measurement error could result from a deliberate effort by firms to underreport their 
gross income so as to minimize their tax liability, however, strict enforcement of that of 
the tax laws by the tax authority, coupled with high penalties in the Uganda’ Income Tax 
Act might minimize underreporting by firms. This does not rule out the possibility that 
underreporting will exaggerate the effective tax rates. The estimation equations are: 
 
First stage:                                                                                                    
Second stage:                   ̂                                                                     
Where; 
    is the effective tax rate for firm i at time t; 
    is gross income/receipts for firm i at time t;   
    vector of other determinants of effective tax rates; depreciation, leverage and before 
tax profits/chargeable income; 





   is a vector of two dummy variables that equal to 1 if a firm is categorized as either 
LTO or MTO and 0 otherwise (the instruments). 
 
Finally, data are observed over nine fiscal years. It is likely that the residuals in 
equation (1.4) are correlated over time for any given firm, which can lead to serial 
correlation. I, therefore, cluster the standard errors at the level of fixed effects in equation 
(1.4) i.e. at the firm level. The next section describes the data. 
 
1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The data used in the analysis are an unbalanced panel from Uganda’s corporate 
income tax returns.
3
 These data are an electronic version of the corporate tax returns of 
firms that are registered for taxes, which can be defined as formal firms. Formal firms are 
assigned by the tax authority to the Large, the Medium, or the Small Taxpayers’ Offices 
(LTO, MTO, or STO) depending on their type of economic activity and/or their annual 
gross sales revenue. If a firm operates informally its income and related expenses are not 
in this dataset. Formal firms that transact with informal firms may have some of their 
expenses incurred in generating income disallowed by the tax administration since there 
is no third-party information to verify the transaction. Consequently, two formal firms 
may have different effective tax rates because one transacts with an informal firm and 
may have some of its expenses disallowed as deductions yet the other firm is allowed to 
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 These data are non-public; they are from the electronic returns filed with the Uganda Revenue Authority, 





deduct them for tax purposes. Tax administration data do not include informal firms 
because such firms are not known to the tax authority even though they exist and conduct 
transactions with formal firms. Table 1.1 below shows the Corporate Effective Tax Rates 
of Ugandan firms, constructed using equation (1.1).   
Table 1.1: Corporate Effective Tax Rates (ETR) in Uganda 
  ETR 
Fiscal Year Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
2009/10 4,426 3.3% 0.089 
2010/11 7,229 3.1% 0.158 
2011/12 9,608 3.5% 0.516 
2012/13 11,348 4.0% 0.884 
2013/14 13,417 3.6% 0.386 
2014/15 13,698 3.1% 0.163 
2015/16 16,623 10.4% 0.363 
2016/17 16,094 10.4% 0.474 
2017/18 15,741 11.3% 1.133 
ALL 108,184 6.7% 0.609 
 
Even though Uganda has a flat corporate tax rate of 30 percent, it is clear from 
Table 1.1 that the effective tax rate is much lower, about 6.7 percent on average. Indeed, 
the rate was as low as 3.3 percent in FY 2009/10, after which the effective tax rate 
increased by about 7.3 percentage points to 10.4 percent in FY 2015/16 and then to 11.3 
percent as of FY 2017/18. The increase in the effective tax rate in recent years may be a 
result of the introduction of the public finance management act in the year 2015, which 
provided tax foresight to both businesses and the tax administrator. In addition, other tax 





increase in effective tax rates. Nonetheless, estimating the impact of the law change and 
recent tax policy reforms is not the focus in this chapter, but is under development for 
future work. These data cover nine fiscal years (FY), i.e. from FY 2009/10 to FY 
2017/18. The entire dataset has 108,184 tax returns over the nine years; the number of 
returns in each fiscal year is shown in Table 1.2.  




% of returns with a corporate 
income tax liability 
2009/10 4,426 4.1% 49.4% 
2010/11 7,229 6.7% 49.6% 
2011/12 9,608 8.9% 50.2% 
2012/13 11,348 10.5% 51.7% 
2013/14 13,417 12.4% 54.7% 
2014/15 13,698 12.7% 57.6% 
2015/16 16,623 15.4% 59.7% 
2016/17 16,094 14.9% 59.6% 
2017/18 15,741 14.6% 61.5% 
ALL 108,184 100%  
The numbers include 2,510 returns for partnerships. However, partnerships are pass-through entities; this 
means that income earned by such entities is taxed at the individual level. To that effect their effective 
corporate tax rate is zero and they are not included in the regression analysis undertaken in this chapter.        
 
Table 1.2 shows that, on average over these nine years, about 54.9 percent of the 
firms in the dataset pay some corporate income tax, and that these firms have positive 
effective tax rates. Firms with zero effective tax rates are either exempt from the 
corporate income tax, or the income generated in a given year is offset by the expenses 
incurred in that year. However, the main interest in this chapter, as explained in the 





the analysis is based on 54,551 complete and non-zero returns. These returns include all 
firms in the Large, the Medium, and the Small Taxpayers’ Offices whose return is 
complete and non-zero. The available data do not distinguish between firms that are 
exempt from corporate income tax and those that simply minimize their tax liability to 
zero – this is one of the limitations of the dataset.  
 
The summary statistics, and a brief description of the variables from the 54,551 
complete and non-zero returns, are presented in Table 1.12. It is important to note that 
accounting/gross profits refer to receipts from the sale of goods and services less the cost 
of the goods sold, and they differ from before tax profits/chargeable income since the 
latter does not include financial expenses, depreciation allowance, and any investment tax 
credits. A firm may have positive accounting profits but zero or negative chargeable 
income if its positive accounting profits are due to financial expenses, depreciation 
allowance, employee compensation or investment tax credits; such a firm will pay zero 
corporate taxes. All the variables are log-transformed because the main interest is 
estimating an elasticity that captures the responsiveness of effective corporate tax rates to 
changes in firm size while controlling for its other determinants. The next section 





1.5 Results and Discussion 
1.5.1 Gross Income as a Measure of Firm Size and ETRs 
Table 1.3 shows results from a fixed effects (OLS) estimation as specified by 
equation (1.4) –without the higher-order terms. The results show the effect of firm size 
measured by log gross income on log ETRs. The estimates show the responsiveness of 
effective tax rates to changes in firm size, which are elasticities.   
 
The results in column (1) of Table 1.3 are without firm fixed effects and any 
control variables, while column (2) includes only firm-level fixed effects. Specification 
(3) includes both firm-level fixed effects and year-specific dummies. Year specific 
dummies are then excluded in column (4), and only before tax profits are added as a 
control variable. Column (5) excludes year-specific dummies and adds depreciation 
allowance and financial expenses as control variables. Year-specific dummy variables 
and before tax profits are then included in column (6). Finally, column (7) includes firm-






Table 1.3: Effect of Firm Size Measured by Gross Income on Effective Tax Rates 
 Log Effective Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        


























Log profits before 
tax 








No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,551 54,551 54,551 54,551 54,551 54,551 54,551 
R-squared 0.015 0.039 0.406 0.181 0.040 0.531 0.536 
Number of 
clusters/firms 
 20,988 20,988 20,988 20,988 20,988 20,988 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level: ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Adding interaction terms of Log gross income with all the control variables (Log before-tax profits, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation expense) and 
interaction terms amongst control variables themselves to column (7) marginally reduced the effect of firm size on effective tax rates. The results suggest that a 
10 percent increase in firm size leads to a 2.4 percent decrease in effective tax rates. The result is statistically significant at the 1 percent. Except for the 
coefficient on the interaction term between log gross income and log depreciation allowance that is significant at the 5 percent level, the rest of the interaction 
terms are not statistically significant. Regressions that include interaction terms are estimated for all the results in this chapter, and the results are very similar. 






Without any control variables, not even firm fixed effects or year-specific 
dummies, there is a positive correlation between effective tax rates and firm size of 
0.089. Adding firm fixed effects only in column (2), increases the correlation to 0.343. 
With year-specific dummies added in specification, the effect greatly reduces to 0.033, 
although it is still slightly positive. All these conditional effects are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Excluding the year-specific dummies and adding only 
firm profits (column (4)) reduces the conditional correlation to 0.006. This effect is not 
statistically significant. Column (5) shows that excluding the year-specific dummies and 
adding the depreciation allowance and financial expense variables, but excluding the 
before tax profits variable has little effect, relative to column (2), with a conditional 
correlation of 0.354. This result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
When year-specific dummy variables AND the before tax profits variable are 
included as shown in column (6) of Table 1.3, the conditional correlation becomes 
strongly negative. This result shows that a 10 percent increase in gross income is 
associated with 2.7 percent decrease in effective tax rates. Column (7) shows that, adding 
the depreciation allowance and financial allowance to column (6), marginally reduces the 
effect by 0.2 percentage points to 2.5 percent for a 10 percent increase in gross income. 
This result is highly statistically significant and precisely estimated with a 95% 






Recall that, year-specific dummy variables are added to control for variables that 
change over time but affect all firms in the same way with respect to their taxes, such as 
changes in the macroeconomic environment. In addition, these year-specific dummy 
variables account for the exogenous change in the ETRs resulting from the introduction 
of the public finance management law in 2015. Depreciation expenses are included to 
capture the capital intensity of a firm; financial expenses capture a firm’s leverage since 
interest payments are tax deductible while dividends are not; and before-tax profits are 
added to capture the profitability of a firm for tax purposes. If indeed firm size does not 
matter, then including these control variables together with the year-specific dummies 
and firm-fixed effects should result in an insignificant effect of firm size on effective tax 
rates. However, the main results in column (7) of Table 1.3 suggest that conditional on 
these control variables, firm size still matters in Uganda. The possible explanation as to 
why that might be the case is explored later in this section.     
 
1.5.2 Alternative Measures of Firm Size and ETRs 
Table 1.4 shows estimates of equation (1.4), again without the higher-order terms, 
for alternative measures of firm size. The main purpose of this table is to check the 
robustness of the results of results in column (7) of Table 1.3 by using different measures 
of firm size.  





Specification (1) of Table 1.4 shows results with the log of total employee 
compensation as a measure for firm size, constructed based on Davis, Haltiwanger, and 
Schuh (1996). Specification (2) uses a value added measure of firm size, which deducts 
the cost of goods sold from a firm’s gross income, and specification (3) uses a two-year 
average of gross income as a measure for firm size, this measures adjusts for temporary 
increases or decreases in gross income in any given fiscal year.      
 
Table 1.4: Effect of Alternative Measures of Firm Size on Effective Tax Rates 
 Log Effective Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log total employee compensation -0.235*** 
(0.013) 
  
Log value added by firm  -0.581*** 
(0.042) 
 
Two year average of log gross income   -0.076*** 
(0.018) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 39,370 54,551 32,248 
R-squared 0.546 0.595 0.586 
Number of clusters 15,071 20,988 12,261 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables/other determinants of 
ETRs include: Log before tax profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation 
expenses. The total employee compensation is constructed based on Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) 
as         
 
 
            , which is the average size of firm   at time  ;               are the total 
employee compensation by firm   at time periods           respectively. Finally, the value added 






Specification (1) of Table 1.4 shows that a 10 percent increase in average total 
employee compensation is associated with a 2.35 percent decrease in effective tax rates. 
This result is significant at the 1 percent level, and it is only 0.19 percentage points less 
than the main result from Table 1.3 (column (7)) in absolute terms. In specification (2), a 
10 percent increase in the value-added by a firm results in a 5.81 percent decrease in 
effective tax rates. This result is significant at the 1 percent level and is about double the 
magnitude of the main result from Table 1.3. This result implies that holding everything 
else constant, firms that add more value will tend to experience a much larger decrease in 
effective tax rate rates. Finally, the result from specification (3) in Table 1.4 shows that 
after adjusting for temporary increases or decreases in gross income, a 10 percent 
increase in the average gross income may induce a 0.76 percent decrease in effective tax 
rates. This result is significant at the 1 percent level. This result implies that the 
conditional effect of firm size on effective tax rates in much smaller in the long run. The 
results in both Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 suggest that conditional on the control variables, 
an increase in firm size is associated with a decrease in effective tax rates, and the result 
is robust to alternative measures of firm size. 
 
The main result from these two subsections, column (7) in Table 1.3, is robust to 
alternative measures of firm size. The result suggests that a 10 percent increase in firm 
size is associated with a 2.5 percent decrease in ETRs on average; the result is 





effective tax rates were fully accounted for by differences in before tax profits/chargeable 
income and allowable deductions, then column (7) in Table 1.3 should result in an 
insignificant effect of firm size on the effective tax rate. However, that is not the case 
because there is likely to be variation in effective tax rates that arises from small formal 
firms transacting with informal firms, which is captured in the coefficient on firm size.      
  
1.5.3 A Nonlinear Effect of Firm Size on Effective Tax Rates 
As discussed in the previous subsection, the main result from Table 1.3 suggests a 
negative log-linear effect of firm size on ETRs. However, studies of effective tax rates in 
developing countries have found nonlinear effects, and some suggest a U-shaped 
relationship (Mascagni and Mengistu, 2017 and Carreras et al. 2017) while others suggest 
the inverse, that is, the middle firms shoulder the highest burden (Gauthier and Reinikka, 
2006). In addition, a scatter plot of log effective tax rates (average) and log gross income 
suggests a non-linear relationship between effective tax rates and firm size, as shown in 





Figure 1.1: A Scatter Plot of Average Log Effective Tax Rates and Log Gross 
Income 
 
This figure suggests that the effect of firm size on effective tax rates is likely to be non-linear. The vertical 
axis shows the Average Effective tax rate and not the effect of expected value of log Effective Tax Rate for 
a given value of log gross income.  
 
To parsimoniously but flexibly estimate this relationship, higher order terms of 
log gross income are added to equation (1.4) as long as they are significant. The results 
are presented in Table 1.5. Specification (2) in Table 1.5 adds a squared term of log gross 
income to the main result (specification (1)); the coefficient on this term is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Specification (3) then adds a cubic term; and the linear, 
squared and cubic terms are all significant at the 1 percent level. This result provides 








Table 1.5: Effect of Firm Size on Effective Tax Rates-Nonlinear Effects 
 Log Effective Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 










Log gross income-cubed   -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,551 54,551 54,551 
R-squared 0.536 0.537 0.539 
Number of clusters 20,988 20,988 20,988 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables/other determinants of 
ETRs include: Log before tax profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation 
expenses. 
 
  Figure 1.2 graphs specification (3) of Table 1.5 over the range of data with control 
variables evaluated at their means, this Figure shows that the effect is quite steeply 
negative for small firms but mostly flat in the middle range, and then becomes negative 





Figure 1.2: Effect of Firm Size on Effective Tax Rates 
 
Figure 1.2 plots specification (3) in Table 1.5 over the range data. 
The control variables are evaluated at their means, the figure also includes a 95% confidence interval, the 
confidence interval is wider for smaller and larger firms while most tight for medium-sized firms.   
 
Given that the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) was introduced in 2015, 
and that the average Effective Tax Rate increased by 7.3 percentage points from 3.1 
percent in FY2014/15 to 10.4 percent in FY2015/16, the introduction of the PFMA might 





divided into two time periods, pre-PFMA and post-PFMA, to check whether the effect of 
firm size on effective tax rates also changed. The results are in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7.   
Table 1.6: Effect of Firm Size on Effective Tax Rates-Nonlinear Effects from FY 
2009/10 to FY 2014/15 (Pre-PFMA) 
 Log Effective Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 










Log gross income-cubed   -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,028 29,028 29,028 
R-squared 0.223 0.225 0.231 
Number of clusters 13,174 13,174 13,174 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables/other determinants of 
ETRs include: Log before tax profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation 
expenses. This Table is the same as Table 1.5, but it is for periods before the introduction of the Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA) in 2015, which might have altered how effective tax rates change as 














Table 1.7: Effect of Firm Size on Effective Tax Rates-Nonlinear Effects from FY 
2015/16 to FY 2017/18 (Post-PFMA) 
 Log Effective Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 










Log gross income-cubed   -0.002* 
(0.001) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,523 25,523 25,523 
R-squared 0.288 0.290 0.291 
Number of clusters 14,552 14,552 14,552 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at a firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables/other determinants of 
ETRs include: Log before tax profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation 
expenses. This Table is the same as Table 1.5, but it is for periods after the introduction of the Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA) in 2015, which might have altered how effective tax rates change as 
firm size increases.   
 
As seen in specification (1) of both Table 1.6 and Table 1.7, a 10 percent increase 
in gross income is associated with a 2.1 percent and 2.9 percent decrease in effective tax 
rates, pre- and post-PFMA, respectively – which is a difference of 0.8 percentage points. 
These results are both statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results from both 
the pre- and post-PFMA both support the existence of a non-linear relationship between 
firm size and effective tax rates. Figure 1.3, a graph of specification (3) from both Table 
1.6 and Table 1.7, suggests that, relative to the pre-PFMA period, the effect in the post-





middle range and large firms. Figure 1.3, therefore, suggests that the introduction of the 
PFMA in 2015 might have altered the effect of firm size on effective tax rates in ways 
that attempt to equalize the effective tax rates across all firms.   
Figure 1.3: Effect of Firm Size on Effective Tax Rates 
Figure 1.3 shows the relationship between Firm Size and Effective Tax Rates, before and after the Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA) was introduced in Uganda in 2015. This figure is a plot of specifications 
(3).from Table 1.12 and Table 1.13. The control variables are evaluated at their means, the figure also 
includes a 95% confidence interval, the confidence interval is wider for smaller firms while most tight for 
medium and large-sized firms. 
 
The negative effects discussed in this chapter so far suggest that the 
responsiveness of corporate income tax payments to changes in firm size is less than the 
responsiveness of corporate profits to changes in size, which points to the ability of larger 





points to differences in access to tax information and in the ability to interpret the tax law 
by firms of different sizes. Given that smaller firms face resource constraints and may not 
be able to afford the services of a tax planner, it is likely that they are at a tax 
disadvantage. On the other hand, the tax law might be very complicated and subject to 
multiple interpretations by both the tax authority and businesses, which allows room for 
misreporting of income and related expenses. Based on the findings in this chapter, one 
can argue that the corporate tax regime is regressive in gross income, but it should be 
noted that the corporate tax rate is 30 percent regardless of size, and the allowable 
deductions are accessible to all eligible firms. The results, therefore, suggest that the tax 
law might be complicated for small businesses, or that the gaps in both tax policy and 
administration are being exploited more aggressively by large firms.   
 
Given that the results include controls such as financial expenses, depreciation 
allowance, and profitability for tax purposes (before-tax profits), if indeed these controls 
account for the differences in effective tax rates, then firm size should not have a 
significant effect on effective tax rates. But, holding these variables constant there is still 
a significant negative effect of firm size on effective tax rates; this suggests that there is 
variation in effective tax rates as a result of the informality of the overall economy. It is 





labor expenses were also added to specification (1) of Table 1.5 and the instrumental 




A possible explanation for the significant negative effect is that the nature of 
operations that small formal firms are involved in might involve working with informal 
firms, which puts them at a tax disadvantage. For example, smaller firms are more likely 
to rely on “money lenders” for quick yet expensive credit. Since money lenders operate 
informally, the tax authority is likely to disallow any interest payments to them because 
they cannot be traced; this implies that two formal firms may have different effective tax 
rates because one transacts with an informal firm and may have some of its expenses 
disallowed as deductions, yet the other firm is allowed to deduct all its expenses. To that 
effect, informality is likely to be costly for smaller formal businesses that choose to work 
with informal firms.  
 
In contrast, larger firms have collateral and can borrow from formal institutions, 
thus deducting the interest paid on such credit and thereby gaining a tax advantage. This, 
therefore, implies that the level of informality in the Ugandan economy and other 
developing countries puts small formal businesses at a tax disadvantage. It should be 
noted that the tax system is not designed to put smaller firms at a tax disadvantage, but 
improvements could be made to account for the structural challenges within the economy 
such as providing a relatively lower tax rate for small businesses and also minimizing the 
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number of allowable deductions. Such changes may correct for some of the unintended 
effects of the corporate tax design on small businesses and encourage other informal 
businesses to formalize their operations.  
 
1.5.4 Robustness checks  
Instrumental Variables (IVs) and Median Regression Estimates 
 As discussed in the empirical framework, firm assignment to the large or the 
medium tax office is used to generate instruments that can be used to reduce bias due to 
any random measurement error in gross income and buttress the main results in this 
chapter. The results from the first stage are presented in specification (1) of Table 1.8; 
both the instruments have a positive and statistically significant effect on gross income. 
This means that the instruments have predictive power for gross income beyond what the 
other variables in the regression have. The F-statistic is 1101.59 and is highly significant 
(last row in Table 1.9), which demonstrates that the instrument is strong. The second 
stage results are presented in Table 1.9, and specification (1) shows that the “causal” 
effect of firm size on effective tax rates is indeed negative. The results show that a 10 
percent increase in firm size will likely result in a 3.2 percent decrease in effective tax 
rates. The result in Table 1.9 is very close to the main result from the last column of 









Table 1.8: First-stage Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimates 
 Log gross income  
 (1) 
Firm assigned to the Large Taxpayers' Office 2.323*** 
 (0.061) 
Firm assigned to the Medium Taxpayers' Office 1.600*** 
 (0.033) 
Controls Yes 
Year specific dummy Yes 
Sector-specific dummy Yes 
Observations 54,551 
R-squared 0.651 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables: Log before tax 
profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation expenses. Firm assignment to the 
large or the medium tax offices are used as instruments for Log gross income. 
 
Table 1.9: IV Estimates Second-stage 
 Log Effective Tax Rate 
 (1) 
Log gross income -0.315*** 
(0.015) 
Controls Yes 
Year specific dummy Yes 
Sector-specific dummy  Yes 
Observations 54,551 
R-squared 0.500 
First stage partial R-squared 0.1591 
First stage F-statistic 1101.59 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at the firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables/other determinants of 
ETRs include: Log before tax profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation 
expenses. The instrumented variable is Log gross income and the instruments are dummy variables for 






As shown earlier in Figure 1.1, there might be outliers that result from random 
measurement error in gross income, to minimize the influence of outliers on the 
conclusions drawn in this chapter, a median regression was used. The results are shown 
in Table 1.10.  
  
Table 1.10: The Effect of Firm Size Measured by Gross Income on Effective Tax 
Rates using a Median Regression 
 Log Effective Tax Rate  
 (1) (2) (3) 










Log gross income-cubed   -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,551 54,551 54,551 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The control variables/other determinants of ETRs include: Log before tax 
profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation expenses. 
 
Table 1.10 shows that the results support a negative and non-linear effect of firm 
size on effective tax rates. The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In 
addition, results for the alternative measures of firm size are presented in Table 1.14, and 
the results are slightly larger in magnitude relative to the results in Table 1.5. Still, they 
all show a negative effect of firm size on effective tax rates. These results, therefore, 





measurement error in gross income may not be very pronounced as earlier anticipated. 
Note that most empirical taxation research that the author is aware of from developing 
countries may acknowledge problems associated with random measurement error but the 
existing research does very little to address any of these problems. Assuming that the 
government of Uganda makes the thresholds for assigning firms to the large and the 
medium taxpayers’ office public, this will present an opportunity for future research that 
analyzes the behavior of firms at these thresholds. One can then check whether firms with 
gross incomes close to the thresholds underreport to avoid scrutiny from the tax 
authorities.        
  
Finally, there may still be problems if the process of assigning firms to large or 
medium taxpayers’ offices is subject to measurement errors that are correlated with the 
measurement error in gross income; if that happens, then the IV estimates will be 
inconsistent. One way that the process of assigning firms to LTO or MTO might be 
subject to measurement error is that increased scrutiny from the tax authority for firms 
assigned to Large or Medium taxpayers’ offices might result in bunching at the cutoffs. 
Firms just slightly above the cutoff might underreport their gross income to avoid 
scrutiny from the tax authority (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018).  However, in 
Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018), the cutoffs are public knowledge which is not the 






While exercising appropriate caution when drawing causal conclusions, an 
increase in gross income does not automatically cause the effective tax rate to decrease. It 
is what firms do with the increase in gross income that might lead to a decrease in 
effective tax rates. When gross income increases, firms are likely to hire more workers, 
which means an increase in employee compensation, firms may automate some of their 
operations or invest in capital assets – this results in an increase in the depreciation 
allowance, firms may borrow more formally with their increased size – have enough 
collateral, which increases their interest deductions, and firms are also likely to invest in 
research and development. These actions will result in an increase in total allowable 
deductions, which should reduce a firm’s effective tax rate for a given level of gross 
income. Holding everything else constant, an increase in allowable deductions will lead 
to a decrease in effective tax rates. To test some of these channels, total allowable 
deductions and its subcomponents, such as depreciation allowance, financial expenses 
and employee compensation, are regressed on gross income. The effects from the fixed 
effects and instrumental variable estimations are shown in Table 1.11 and Table 1.15 








Table 1.11: Fixed Effects Estimates of Impact of Gross Income on Allowable 
Deductions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




















Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-specific 
dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,279 54,551 54,551 54,540 
R-squared 0.053 0.021 0.028 0.289 
Number of clusters 16,198 20,988 20,988 20,985 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.  
 
 
Table 1.11 shows that gross income has a positive effect on all four variables. 
This provides evidence that it is the increase in these allowable deductions as gross 
income increases that may lead to a decrease in effective tax rates. However, the 
elasticities in Table 1.11 are expected to be larger than 1 since larger firms have the 
ability to exploit the allowable deductions which consequently reduces their effective tax 
rates. This means that the allowable deductions as a proportion of gross income should 
increase as firms get larger. The fact that the elasticities are less than 1 in Table 1.11 
suggests that allowable deductions as a proportion of gross income are decreasing as 
firms get larger. This may reflect random measurement error in gross income. Using 





instruments for gross income, some of the elasticities are more than 1 as shown in Table 
1.15, which is as expected.  
 
Note that firms that incur any of these expenses and any other allowable 
deductions in Uganda, and do not claim them as tax deductions for corporate income tax 
purposes may face an increase in effective tax rates as gross income increases. This may 
happen because the corporate income tax is complex. Small firms may also lack tax 
information or the ability to interpret it. To test some of these claims and what they mean 
for tax compliance in sub-Saharan Africa, tax authorities may consider implanting tax 
information campaigns targeted towards small firms, and assess how these firms respond 
to the tax information. The next section provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
1.6 Conclusion  
Tax policies in developing countries are usually designed to mirror those in 
developed economies, but challenges with informality, poor governance, high cost of tax 
compliance and low tax morale tend to influence firm decisions in response to changes in 
tax policy. The focus in this chapter was to estimate the effect of firm size on effective 
tax rates and assess the progressivity of the corporate tax regime regarding business 
income.  The results suggest a negative effect of firm size on effective tax rates. On 





effective tax rates; this negative effect is not driven by measurement error and is robust to 
both alternative measures of firm size and outliers. In addition, there is evidence that 
supports a non-linear effect, the effect is quite steeply negative for small firms but mostly 
flat in the middle range, and then becomes negative again for large firms.  
   
Even though the tax system is not designed to disadvantage smaller firms, the 
results suggest that these firms face a relatively higher tax burden, which is a disincentive 
to other informal small businesses to formalize their operations. To that effect, 
improvements can be made to the income tax law to account for structural challenges that 
small firms face by lowering their corporate tax rate. At the same time, provisions to 
minimize the number of deductions that large firms take should be put in place to correct 
for some of the unintended effects of the corporate tax design on smaller businesses.  
On the tax administration front, tax clinics could be put in place to provide information to 
firms that cannot otherwise afford the services of tax accountants. The effects of such tax 
clinics on tax compliance should be evaluated in future research. These interventions will 
not only encourage informal smaller businesses to become formal – which should widen 
the tax base –  but will also ensure that larger firms pay a fair amount of their corporate 
profits in taxes. It should be noted that informality is a challenge for most developing 
countries, and the results in this chapter may not necessarily hold if most informal firms 
formalized their operations. In general, corporations do not pay taxes, instead people do; 





income tax on individuals in Uganda; this is another area for potential future research and 






Table 1.12: Summary Statistics and a Brief Description of the Data 
Variable Description    Mean Std. Dev. Min Max | Observations 
                  
log Effective Tax Rate 
The variable is the logged shared 
of income spent on corporate 
income tax payments 
overall -3.05 
1.480 -21.32 4.92 
| 
N =   54551 
 between  
1.390 -19.33 3.35 
| 
n =   20988 
  within   
0.843 -16.88 3.84 
| 
 
log gross income 
The logged amount of money that 
Ugandan corporations derive 
from the sale of goods or/or 
provision of services  
overall 
19.74 2.068 11.70 28.24 
| 
N =   54551 
 between 
 1.893 12.90 27.95 
| 
n =   20988 
  within 
 0.487 12.36 23.63 
| 
 
Log financial expense 
This category of include expenses 
of a financial nature incurred in 
generating income i.e. Interest 
expenses, Bank Charges, 
Insurance, exchange rate losses, 
provision for bad debts 
overall 
12.14 5.948 0 25.54 
| 
N =   54551 
 between 
 5.863 0 25.54 
| 
n =   20988 
  within 
 2.425 -7.17 33.86 
| 
 
Log depreciation expense 
The estimated loss in value of 
capital equipment (wear and tear) 
at the end of every fiscal year is 
captured by this variable 
overall 
11.40 6.936 0 25.85 
| 
N =   54551 
 between 
 6.845 0 25.48 
| 
n =   20988 
  within 







Log  average employee 
compensation 
 
This an alternative measure of 
firm size constructed as the 
average of employee 






















N =   39370 
between 
 1.625 11.54 25.42 
| 
n =   15071 
  within  0.402 13.09 21.14 |  
Log Value Added  
This variable is an alternative 
measure of firm size; it is 
constructed by deducting the cost 










N =   54551 




   
   
Two year average of log gross 
income 
This Variable is a two-year 
average of gross income. The 
main objective of this variable is 
to adjust for temporary increases 












N =   38354 
between 
 1.901 13.83 27.97 








log of before tax profit 
This variable captures the before 
tax profit after adjusting the gross 
profits for expenses incurred in 
generating income and any other 











N =   54551 
 between 
 1.957 0 26.79 
| 
n =   20988 
  within 
 0.748 1.46 23.94 
| 
 
These variables were constructed from the electronic corporate income tax returns data from the Uganda Revenue Authority. Uganda’s tax regime is a voluntary compliance regime, implying 
that businesses voluntarily declare the income earned and the expenses incurred in generating that income for a given fiscal year. These data are considered final after the initial checks to 
ensure consistency unless a tax audit proves otherwise. It should also be noted that expenses above Uganda Shillings 5million (about USD 1,350) in one transaction cannot be allowed as 
deductions without providing the tax identification number of the suppliers.5  To get a feel of what the raw numbers look like one has to take the exponents of the numbers.  The statistics are 
logged because we use the log-transformed numbers in the estimation.  
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Table 1.13: Fixed Effects and IV Estimates with Employee Compensation added as 
Controls 
 Log Effective Tax Rate 
 (FE) (IV) 




















Controls Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes No 
Year specific dummy Yes Yes 
Sector specific dummy No Yes 
Observations 54,540 54,540 
R-squared 0.547 0.549 
Number of clusters 20,985  
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. The control variables/other determinants of ETRs include: Log before tax 
profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation expenses. The results in column 












Table 1.14: Median Regression and Alternative Measures of Firm Size 
 Log Effective Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log gross income -0.275*** 
(0.004) 
   
Log total employee compensation  -0.398*** 
(0.005) 
  
Log value added by firm   -0.962*** 
(0.002) 
 
Two year average of log gross 
income 
   -0.202*** 
(0.006) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,551 39,370 54,551 32,248 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The control variables/other determinants of ETRs include: Log before tax 
profits/chargeable income, Log financial expenses, and Log depreciation expenses. The total employee 
compensation is constructed based on Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) as         
 
 
            , 
which is the average size of firm   at time  ;               are the total employee compensation by firm   at 
time periods           respectively. The two year average of log gross income is constructed in a similar 
way. Finally, the value added measure of firm size is the difference between total sales revenue and cost of 














Table 1.15: IV Estimates of Impact of Gross Income on Allowable Deductions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






















Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-specific 
dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,279 54,551 54,551 54,540 
R-squared 0.419 0.172 0.255 0.569 
Robust standard errors in parentheses:  ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. The instrumented variable is Log gross income and the instruments are dummy 
















Table 1.16 Effect of Firm Size on Effective Tax Rates (Alternative Specifications)  
 Log effective tax rates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log gross income 0.144*** -0.175 -5.572*** 
 (0.004) (0.112) (0.738) 
Log gross income squared  0.007** 0.280*** 
  (0.003) (0.037) 
Log gross income cubed   -0.005*** 
   (0.001) 
Log depreciation allowance ratio -0.481*** -0.403*** -0.400*** 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) 
Log financial expenses ratio -0.240*** -0.136*** -0.135*** 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) 
Log before tax profits ratio 9.457*** 8.981*** 8.936*** 
 (0.200) (0.292) (0.291) 
    
Year-specific dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54,551 54,551 54,551 
R-squared 0.536 0.537 0.539 
Number of clusters/firms 20,988 20,988 20,988 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. The control variables in this table are expressed as ratios of log gross income. This is 
an alternative specification, the linear estimate in specification (1) changes the sign and this will be 











Chapter 2  
 
The Impact of Changes in Excise Tax Rates on Firm 
Sales Revenue, Firm Profits and Government Tax 



















A staunch smoker will give anything for a good puff, and the government knows 
it. To that effect, governments tend to explore every opportunity to increase tax rates 
payable on products such as cigarettes that have a relatively inelastic demand (Ramsey, 
1927; Mankiw et al., 2009). However, it is unclear whether the goods that governments 
perceive to have inelastic demand are actually inelastic in demand. Governments can 
continue to increase tax rates on such products to the extent that their demand becomes 
elastic (Callison and Kaestner, 2014).  The primary goal of this chapter is to estimate the 
impact of changes in excise tax rates in Financial Year 2015/16 on firms’ sales revenue, 
profits, and government excise tax revenue in Uganda.   
 
In many developing countries, timelines for a budget cycle are documented in 
some form of legislation. Still, it is not clear when proposed tax legislation will become 
law since the approval processes may take a long time. Clear and adhered to timelines in 
a budget process tend to allow for predictability and reduce uncertainty for both firms – 
regarding what taxes they will face the next fiscal year – and the tax administration – in 
terms of focusing their tax enforcement efforts. On the other hand, certainty with regard 
to future taxes may undermine a tax policy change’s effectiveness since firms and 
individuals may alter their behavior in anticipation of the tax change. Firms may also 
aggressively lobby against the tax change, and influence the legislature’s decisions, hence 






Traditionally, excise tax rates have been limited in the scope of their imposition. 
Such tax rates’ main objective was to correct for market failures such as negative 
externalities associated with the production or consumption of goods such as cigarettes, 
alcohol, and petroleum products, among others. An externality arises when the actions of 
one party make another party worse off (private marginal benefit is less than social 
marginal cost) or better off (marginal social benefit exceeds private marginal cost) 
without any form of compensation (Coase, 1960; Meade, 1952). Under the assumption 
that markets would have otherwise been perfect, for negative externalities the 
government imposes a “Pigouvian tax” equivalent to the marginal social cost incurred by 
the affected party (Baumol et al., 1988; Laffont, 1988; Gruber, 2005). In practice, 
however, excise taxes in developing countries have turned out to be a convenient way to 
generate government revenue; this is because such taxes are relatively easy to administer, 
and the targeted products tend to be relatively inelastic in demand (Ramsey, 1927; 
Bolnick and Haughton, 1998; Hines, 2007). On the other hand, the demand for such 
goods might be relatively elastic. Also, businesses and consumers may respond to an 
increase in an excise tax by involving themselves in illicit trade or buying the same good 
in an alternative nearby low tax jurisdiction (Callison and Kaestner, 2014). Such behavior 
by both businesses and consumers suggests that goods which are perceived to be inelastic 






In Uganda, the scope of excisable goods – that is, the goods that attract excise 
taxes – has increased significantly over the years beyond just cigarettes, alcoholic 
beverages, and petroleum products. The list of excisable goods also includes: cement, 
furniture, confectionaries (sweets, chewing gum, and chocolates), bottled drinking water 
and nonalcoholic beverages (sodas and juices), motor vehicle lubricants, cosmetics and 
perfumes, sugar, and cooking oils. All of these products, and their respective excise tax 
rates, are listed in the second schedule of Uganda’s Excise Duty Act of 2014 and its 
subsequent amendments. In the process of widening the scope of excisable goods to raise 
revenue, Ugandan policymakers might be constraining firm output, which may 
discourage new investment and firm growth. The findings in this chapter are intended to 
inform policymakers in Uganda and other developing countries that, while tax revenues 
might increase only marginally in response to an increase in an excise tax rate, firms’ 
sales revenue and profits may significantly decline. In addition, governments may 
consider using excise taxes for purposes of only limiting consumption rather than using 
them as a convenient way to raise government revenue. Governments may explore other 
tax types such as the Value Added Tax or the Personal Income Tax for purposes of 
generating tax revenues.       
  
Excisable goods in Uganda are subject to different tax rates, some of which are 
specific; that is, a firm is required to pay a specific amount of tax per unit of output 





ex-factory price - the selling price of a product less any incidental costs incurred in 
delivering that product to a consumer. The specific rates are somewhat easier for tax 
administrators to enforce than ad-valorem because the former is based on output alone. 
Nonetheless, specific tax rates are not responsive to temporary changes in price, which 
provides lower tax revenue, relative to an ad-valorem tax, whenever prices increase.  
 
A final important issue is that, under a voluntary tax system, where firms 
voluntarily report their production numbers, businesses might respond to either type of 
tax by under-reporting production. Under-reporting is more likely to occur when the tax 
administrator’s probability of detecting such acts is very low, so that the benefits to the 
business of under-reporting exceed the expected penalties (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; 
Yitzhaki, 1974; Blumenthal et al., 2012).  
 
To protect the expected tax revenue from temporary price shocks, policymakers in 
developing countries tend to design a “hybrid” regime with both specific and ad-valorem 
rates, and charging the higher of the two rates after the tax authority assesses the amount 
of tax that is due. This might minimize tax revenue leakages from the tax policy side, but 
the tax regime’s efficiency in raising the required excise tax revenue at the lowest 
possible compliance cost will depend on the tax administration’s ability to track and trace 






As partly alluded to above, excise taxes can be viewed as taxes on production 
since they are charged per unit of output; for example, Uganda charges shillings 45,000 
per one thousand sticks of cigarettes produced.
6
 Firms are likely to respond to an increase 
in tax rates either by transferring the entire tax to the consumer through increased prices 
or by shouldering some of the burden themselves, depending on their market power. If 
firms have some market power and can transfer the entire tax burden onto the consumer, 
firm profits will not be responsive to tax changes. On the other hand, if firms have to 
shoulder some of that burden, profits will decrease in response to an increase in the 
excise tax.    
 
In addition, introducing a tax that is not a lump-sum is generally associated with 
deadweight loss; this means that with a tax increase, the equilibrium level of output will 
be lower than it would have been otherwise. With a broad scope of excisable goods in 
Uganda, driven mainly by the need to increase revenue, policymakers should focus not 
only on tax revenue but also on the implications of tax policy changes for firms’ sales 
revenue and profits. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that increases in 
excise tax rates may not result in any increase in government revenues, but rather have 
significant negative effects on firms’ sales revenue and firm profits. The evidence 
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 This was the rate of tax that was applied to soft cup cigarettes in Fiscal Year 2015/16. At an exchange rate 
of USD 1 to Shs. 3,700, this particular rate of tax is equivalent to about USD 12.16 per 1,000 sticks of soft 
cup cigarettes produced or supplied. The rate was gradually increased in Fiscal Years 2016/17 and 2017/8 
to about USD 14.9. The details of the changes can be found in Uganda’s excise duty amendment acts of the 





generated in this chapter contributes to the scarce literature on empirical taxation in 
developing countries. It estimates the effects of increases in excise tax rates on firms’ 
sales revenue, profits, and government excise tax revenues.  
 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows; Section 2.2 
provides a background; Section 2.3 provides a conceptual framework; Section 2.4 
describes the data; Section 2.5 discusses the empirical strategy; Section 2.6 reports the 
results, and conclusions are summarized in Section 2.7. 
 
 
2.2 Background  
In 2015, the Ugandan government replaced the Budget Act of 2001 with the 
Public Finance Management Act (PFMA). The PFMA altered the timelines for the 
budget process by requiring proposed changes to tax policy and expenditure plans for the 
next fiscal year to be presented to the Ugandan Parliament by 1
st
 April instead of the end 
of June. The proposed changes, in either case, become effective on 1st July. Under the 
old regime, firms and individuals had very little knowledge of what changes they can 
expect until the last day of the fiscal year (30
th
 June). There was still uncertainty beyond 
30
th
 June because the Ugandan Parliament had to discuss and pass the proposed changes. 
The bills were sent to the president for signature before becoming law. This process 





transition, the government collected tax revenue with the revised tax rates regardless of 
whether the changes had been approved, using the Provisional Collection Order. With the 
old regime, there was a large amount of uncertainty for businesses and a risk to the 
government’s revenue effort if the proposed changes were not approved.   
 
Another change that occurred at the same time, which is particularly relevant for 
the purposes of this chapter, is that, in Fiscal Year 2015/16, the Ugandan government 
increased excise tax rates on cigarettes, beer, wine, fuels, motor vehicle lubricants, 
confectionaries, and furniture. The details of these changes are presented in Table 2.1.  










Cigarettes (Uganda Shillings)  52,000 60,000 65,000 
Fuels/Gasoline (Uganda Shillings) 608 628 668 
Cigars (percent) 160% 200% 200% 
Beer (percent) 40% 45% 45% 
Wine (percent) 45% 50% 50% 
Motor Vehicle Lubricants (percent)  0% 5% 10% 
Confectionaries (percent) 0% 10% 20% 
Furniture (percent) 0% 10% 3% 
Un-denatured Spirits (percent) 140% 100% 100% 
The excise tax rates in this table are averages for products that have multiple rates such as cigarettes, beer 
and fuels. The rates for cigarettes are per 1,000 sticks and fuel is per liter, these rates are in Uganda 






Table 2.1 shows the excise tax rates in Uganda from FY 2014/15 – the baseline 
year – and the changes in FYs 2015/16 and 2016/17. Two of the rates are specific and are 
charged per liter or per 1,000 sticks for fuels and cigarettes, respectively. The tax rates on 
cigarettes increased by 15.4 percent and 25.0 percent relative to the baseline rate in FYs 
2015/16 and 2016/17. The tax rates on beer increased by about 12.5 percent relative to 
the baseline rate. On the other hand, Fuels had the lowest increases compared to other 
excisable goods, with increases of 3.3 percent and 9.9 percent in FYs 2015/16 and 
2016/17, respectively. Other products, such as motor vehicle lubricants, confectionaries, 
and furniture, had an excise tax imposed for the first time in FY 2015/16. In FY 2016/17, 
the tax rates on motor vehicle lubricants and confectionaries doubled, while only locally 
manufactured furniture had the tax rate reversed. 
 
Given that some of the products did not have excise tax rates at baseline, it is not 
possible to construct a continuous treatment variable that captures all the changes in the 
excise duty rates. While changes in ad valorem tax rates could be expressed in terms of 
percentage point decreases or increases, this is not possible for excisable goods such as 
cigarettes and fuels because they have specific rates, which are applied per unit of output. 
On the other hand, a binary indicator for a change in the tax rate will throw away 
information on the actual changes. Note that a continuous treatment indicator for those 





on products that did not have a tax rate prior. The existence of specific and ad-valorem 
tax rates for different products makes it impossible to use a continuous treatment 
indicator. While the binary indicator for treatment does not capture the difference in the 
changes, it captures all changes and hence it is used for the main results in this chapter.    
                     
  Under the PFMA, the proposed changes to tax policy are currently presented by 
1
st
 April, three months before the end of the current fiscal year. The approval process is 
expected within two months of that presentation. Once the proposed changes are 
presented in the Ugandan Parliament for debate, they become a public record, and firms 
get to know what taxes they are expected to face in the next tax period with three months 
(April, May and June) left in the current fiscal year. The availability of this information 
about three months before the effective date provides advance notice to firms of the taxes 
they can expect in the next fiscal year. Firms can then be assumed to fully anticipate tax 
rate changes (Mertens and Ravn, 2012). To that effect, the PFMA of 2015 provides 
advance notice. 
  
Advance notice may be advantageous for taxes such as capital gains – a tax on a 
markup of an asset that has appreciated in value such as a stock – where firms can realize 
gains within two to three months before a proposed tax change is implemented. However, 





change, since it might take longer than three months for firms to adjust production plans 
to avoid or minimize their tax liability, even when changes in tax rates are anticipated.  
 
The process of approving excise tax changes with two to three months before the 
end of a fiscal year may not necessarily cause firms to change output in the short run – 
since firms are less likely to act on this information in the short run – but only removes 
the uncertainly that firms might face going into a new fiscal year. It is possible that there 
are two effects here because both reforms were implemented in the same year, one for the 
information availability and the other for changes in the excise tax rates. It is difficult to 
separate these two effects, but providing this clarity alone without any change in the tax 
rates would improve the planning conditions for firms without having an effect on firms’ 
sales revenue and profits. In addition, the information is available to all firms regardless 
of whether their tax rates changed or not, and these firms are likely to process this 
information in the same way. This means that providing tax rates information two or 
three months earlier might have little effect on firms’ sales revenue or output. Under the 
assumption that firms may not in the short run act on the information that their taxes will 
change, and that all firms process the available information in the same way, the effects 





duty rates in FY2015/16 on firms’ sales revenue and profits, not the effect of the changes 




The manufacturers, suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers of the products whose 
taxes have changed, form the “treated” firms, whose outcome variables are compared to 
those of suppliers of other goods that either were not subject to the excise tax or did not 
have their excise tax rates adjusted (comparison group firms). Time-invariant firm-
specific unobserved characteristics are taken into account. The identifying assumption is 
that, conditional on several control variables, including firm fixed effects, in the absence 
of the tax, changes in the outcome variables of the “treated” firms would have otherwise 
been the same as the changes for firms that did not face a change in taxes (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008). The next section discusses the conceptual framework used in this chapter.    
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
The theory of efficient commodity taxation is well established in the tax literature, 
and it is mostly grounded in the Ramsey (1927) rule. This rule suggests that if 
governments cannot impose lump-sum taxes to generate a required amount of revenue, 
commodities with relatively inelastic demand should be taxed more. Other rules indicate 
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 The discussion in the introduction of advance notice by the Public Finance Management Act was a major 
reform in the budget process that allowed the Ugandan government to streamline its timelines, hence its 
inclusion in this chapter. But the effect of such advance notice is not estimated because a period of three 
months or less is too short for firms to adjust their production plans. Also, advance notice affects both 





that if it is challenging to tax commodities such as leisure, its complements should be 
taxed at higher rates (Corlett and Hague, 1953). The other rule that follows from the 
theory on optimal commodity taxation is that tax rates should be inversely proportional to 
their own-price elasticities of demand (Ramsey, 1927; Sandmo, 1987).  Sandmo (1987) 
developed a theoretical model that suggests that all three rules are very similar because 
the assumptions used in all cases have sound economic intuition. The rules developed in 
the literature are premised on the fact that governments will dictate tax rates to satisfy 
their budget constraints.  
 
The rules discussed above focused on what governments do to raise tax revenues 
to satisfy their budget constraints. Little consideration is given to what producers might 
do when they suspect that the government might increase or impose a tax on their output. 
A conceptual framework is developed in this section to systematically think about what 
firms might do when the likelihood of a change in tax rates on their products increases, 
and what the firm’s actions mean for government tax revenues. It closely follows the 
work of Chambers and Quiggin (2000) on production under uncertainty.   
 
Consider a one-product firm. The quantity of the product it produces is denoted 
by    .  The cost function for the output is       where competitive input prices are 
normalized to one for expositional clarity. Suppose the government raises revenue by 





to     . Unfortunately, the firm must make output decisions before learning the 
government’s final tax policy. Therefore, the firm faces uncertainty with two possible 
states of the world. In state    , the government does not raise taxes, and the firms face 
competitive product prices      . In state    , the government does raise taxes, 
and the firms face competitive product prices         .  The probability of states 
        occurring is    and   , respectively, with      ,      , and        .   
The firm’s profit in states 0 and 1 can then be written as: 
               and                   
The firm’s decision problem is to                           . This objective can 
be written as: 
   
   
   (           )     (              )                                                
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition is: 
        
         , which implies that     
                                  
where      
      
  
    and      
       
   







The primary question of interest is how do government tax revenues under 
uncertainty compare to tax revenue in states 0 and 1? To get at this question, one needs to 
derive the marginal costs when     and     and compare them to equation (2.2).  
With tax certainty (when     or    ), the state contingent profits can be redefined as: 
         
        and             
        
The firm’s decision problem is to choose the state-contingent outputs          that 
maximize the firm’s expected profits. The decision problem can be written as:  
   
          
   (      
       )     (         
       )                            
Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions are: 
          
     , which implies that       
                                                   
          
         , which implies that       
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Equation (2.6) means that the marginal cost under tax certainty without a change in tax 
per unit of output is greater then the marginal cost with tax uncertainty. The marginal cost 
with tax uncertainty is greater than the marginal cost under tax certainty with a change in 
tax per unit of output. Since the marginal cost is increasing in output, the relationship in 
equation (2.6) is shown in Figure 2.1  
Figure 2.1: A graph of Marginal Cost against Output 
 
 
It follows from Figure 2.1 that 
                                                                        
 






    
     
    
    
   
     
    
       






Equation (2.7) suggests that the firm will choose the highest level of output under 
tax certainty with no change in the amount of tax per unit of output (   ) as compared to 
the other cases. In addition, the firm chooses more output under uncertainty (  ) as 
compared to a state of tax certainty with a change in tax (   ). Government tax revenue is 
defined as           it follows from equation (2.7) that:  
                                                                                      
Equation (2.8) implies that the government will raise more tax revenue if firms 
get advance notice that there will be no change in the amount of tax per unit of output 
compared to when firms are faced with uncertainty on whether the tax per unit of output 
will change. The advance notice might help governments raise more if they do not plan to 
change tax rates, and firms know it because firms will choose to produce a higher-level 
output.  
The result follows from equation (2.7) is: 
                                                                  
Equation (2.9) implies that in theory, the government can expect to raise more tax 
revenue from a change in the amount of tax per unit of output under tax uncertainty 
relative when there is tax certainty (advance notice), and there is an actual increase in tax. 





a tax increase if firms do not have any advance notice of such a change. Tax uncertainty 
may help the government raise more tax revenue if it plans to actually change tax rates.    
 
Recall that in FY 2015/16, firms in Uganda knew with three months advance 
notice the tax rates that would apply the following tax year. Based on the theory 
discussed above, the expectations are that firms that face a tax increase will choose lower 
output than firms that know that there will not be an increase in tax on their output. The 
other expectation is that government revenues from the tax increase will be lower since 
firms choose lower levels of output relative to firms that do not face a tax increase, and 
all the firms have advance notice about their tax status. The next section describes the 
data.      
 
 
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics  
This chapter’s analysis uses, merged data from Uganda’s corporate income tax 
returns and from available electronic excise tax data,
9
 for the financial years from 
2013/14 to 2016/17. Both datasets have a unique firm identifier that allows the two 
sources of data to be merged. From the excise tax data, firms are identified using an 
anonymous identification number and product descriptions for manufacturers of 
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 Electronic excise data are excel spreadsheets put together by the Uganda Revenue Authority to summarize 





excisable goods; these variables are critical to identify firms that face a change in excise 
tax rates (treated firms). Firm-specific characteristics, including outcome variables of 
interest (firm sales revenue and profits), were obtained from corporate income tax 
returns.
10
 The corporate tax returns data summarize the activities of a firm in a given 
financial year (July to June). The expectation is that the annual corporate return 
declarations and the monthly excise data should match in terms of declared sales 
revenues after adjusting for returned goods. Note that firm-level data include firms’ sales 
revenue and firm profits, but do not include excise revenue payments for the period under 
study – these data are not part of the corporate tax return. Table 2.2 provides an overview 
of the data used for the analysis.  
 
From Table 2.2, the total returns are 60,838, of which 4,445 (7.3%) belong to 
treated firms, and 56,393 (92.7%) belong to comparison group firms. Given that the 
excise tax applies to a small proportion of firms, many more returns belong to firms that 
either were not subject to the excise tax or did not have their excise tax rates adjusted. 
The comparison group is a combination of these two categories of firms.    
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 A brief description of these variables and summary statistics are provided in the appendix. Firm-level 
data used in this study are from the Uganda Revenue Authority, but restrictions apply to the availability of 
these data, and so are not publicly available. Data can however be accessed, if permission is given, from the 











group returns All tax returns  Percent treated  
2013/14   1,272         12,207            13,479  9.4% 
2014/15   1,123         12,630            13,753  8.2% 
2015/16   1,108         15,969            17,077  6.5% 
2016/17      942         15,587            16,529  5.7% 
Total    4,445         56,393            60,838  7.3% 
 
It is noticeable from the data that there are relatively fewer returns from both 
treated and comparison group firms in the second year after the excise tax rates were 
changed (FY2016/17). According to Uganda’s Excise Duty Act, the Uganda Revenue 
Authority must register firms that deal in excisable products. The firms are also required 
to renew their license with the Authority every year. It might be the case that some of the 
treated firms decided not to renew their excise licenses since they did not submit tax 
returns after the change in excise tax rates.  Firms could be substituting away from the 
excisable goods, forcing them to temporarily close rather than dealing with the relatively 
high taxes and stiff competition from the well-established firms in the excise market. The 
substituting process may take time, making it less likely that firms engaged in this type of 
behavior will file a tax return in a year or two after closure. Based on the author’s 
understanding of the Ugandan markets for goods subject to the excise tax, a few large 
firms dominate the market and are still operating. The changing behavior of firms likely 





their behavior – they can self-select in and out of the tax system – this will be 
problematic for estimation, but less so if one controls for firm-level fixed effects.  
 
Ideally, the comparison group should not be very different from the treated group; 
I check the extent to which they may differ in observable characteristics at baseline. A 
two-sample t-test is used to assess the differences between the treated and comparison 
groups’ means at baseline. The differences in the means of the main variables are 
summarized in Table 2.3.   










e t Pr(T>t) 
Log sales revenue 19.23 20.11 0.88 13.77 0.0000*** 
Log gross profits 17.50 17.75 0.24 2.66 0.0078*** 
Log depreciation 
allowance  11.40 11.90 0.50 2.73 0.0063*** 
Log financial 
expenses  12.17 12.56 0.39 2.46 0.0140** 
Log employee 
compensation 16.48 16.57 0.09 1.78 0.0749* 
Means and t-test are estimated by linear regression. The P-values show the extent to which the differences 
between the treated and comparison group means are significant at baseline *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 






Table 2.3 shows that, at baseline, there are significant differences between the 
treated and comparison group firms in the levels of the main outcome variables (firm 
sales revenue and gross profits) since the p-values are less than 0.01. These differences 
do not necessarily pose any estimation challenges since it is the change in the averages 
over time that matter. In the covariates that characterize a firm (log depreciation, log 
financial expenses, and log payroll size/ employee compensation), statistically significant 
differences in log depreciation and log financial expenses are observed between the 
comparison and treated group means at baseline since the p-values are smaller than 0.05. 
On the other hand, the difference in log employee compensation is not statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. The largest difference in these covariates is in log 
depreciation expenses and it is about 0.5 log points. The differences in these covariates 
including employee compensation are accounted for during estimation. According to 
Uganda’s Tax Procedures Code Act of 2014, the penalties for falsifying a tax return are 
very severe and could cause a business to shut down; this, coupled with strict 
enforcement, may ensure relatively accurate data. Nonetheless, for firm level analysis 
there is no choice but to believe the tax enforcement agency that tax returns data are 
considered accurate until a tax audit proves otherwise; the assumption is that these data 
are true record of firms’ economic activity in Uganda. If the assumption is violated then 
the results from the empirical analysis in this chapter may be biased. The next section 






2.5 Empirical Strategy   
In this chapter, both the “standard” difference-in-difference (DID) and DID with 
matching are used to estimate the effect of changes in excise tax rates on firms’ sales 
revenue and profits in Uganda. The DID estimation equation is: 
                                                                                   
where          is the log of the outcome variable (firm sales revenue or firm profits) for 
firm   at time      is a firm-level fixed effect that controls for unobserved time-invariant 
firm-specific characteristics,      is a time trend that is assumed to be the same for both 
treated and comparison group firms; it captures the effect of macroeconomic shocks that 
would affect all firms’ sales revenue and profits in the same way,
11
     is included to 
control for time-varying observable firm-specific characteristics, such as capital structure, 
leverage, and payroll size, which describe the nature of a firm and how it evolves over 
time.     also includes a dummy variable for period     to control for any time-specific 
shocks that affect both treated and comparison group firms in the same way at that time. 
Finally,    is a time-invariant dummy variable that equals 0 for comparison group firms, 1 
for treated firms whose excise tax rates were increased and -1 for firms whose excise tax 
rates were reduced (Taxed firms) for all time periods and “After Fiscal Year 2015-16” is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 for t = 3 and 4. The interaction term is therefore an 
indicator for treatment and equals 1 for treated firm   only after the ‘new’ tax rate is 
implemented. The coefficient on this interaction term is the impact of the change in 
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excise tax. Finally,     is a time-varying firm-level error term that captures unobserved 
time-varying factors that vary over firms and is assumed to be uncorrelated with all 
observed variables in Equation (2.4). That is,  (       |                    )       
 
Suppose that the change in an excise tax is implemented at          , then the 
DID estimator is written as: 
  ̂   (                             )   (                             ), where           
are the treated and untreated (potential) outcomes for a firm, respectively.  
Since it is not possible to observe the untreated outcome for treated firms at          , 
then   (                             ) – how treated firms’ sales revenue or profits would 
have changed in the absence of a change in the excise tax rates – is the missing 
counterfactual trend, the DID estimator assumes that the observed trend in the outcome 
variables for comparison group firms is the same as the counterfactual trend, which is 
known as the “common/parallel trends” assumption (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Glewwe 
and Todd, 2021). This can be written more formally by adding and subtracting the 
unobserved outcome for treated firms after the change in tax  (                ) to the 
expression of the DID estimator, such that: 
 ̂   (                             )   (                             )
  (                )   (                ) 





 ̂   (                             )   (                             )   (             
                ).  
The parallel trends assumption, therefore, means that: 
  (                             )   (                             ), which is the same as 
saying the change in the outcome variables for the treated firms would have been the 
same as the change in the outcomes for the comparison group firms in the absence of the 
change in the excise tax.  
 
In practice, however, the parallel trends assumption may not hold – this 
assumption is tested later in this chapter by regressing pretreated outcomes on the 
indicator for treatment. Given that there are data for four time periods, two periods before 
and two periods after the change in the excise tax, Glewwe and Todd (2021) suggest that, 
if the parallel trends assumption does not hold, then the treatment effect can be estimated 
in the presence of non-parallel linear time trends. The impact of the tax change can also 
be estimated for each period after the tax changes were implemented – this allows the 
treatment effect to vary over time. With these modifications in mind, equation (2.10) can 
be rewritten as:        
                                     ∑     
 
   
                            
where     is an interaction term between    and dummy variables for    , and     . 





(2.11) allows the treatment effect for treated firms to be different at     – One year 
after tax change, and t = 4 – Two years after tax change, and also relaxes the common 
trends assumption by allowing different time trends for treated and comparison group 
firms. It is assumed that                                   , which means that the time-
varying firm-level error term         is uncorrelated with all observed variables in 
Equation (2.11).  
 
The effects from most DID studies are sensitive to the choice of the comparison 
group primarily because one does not observe the outcome of a treated firm in the 
absence of a law change or policy intervention (counterfactual). This problem becomes 
magnified if there is reason to believe that firms can self-select into treatment (Heckman 
and Smith, 1999; Blundell et al., 2004). In this study, the change in the excise tax rates is 
an exogenous process; firms that produce excisable goods do not have the option to self-
select into the tax. In addition, the market for producers of excisable goods is relatively 
small in Uganda, and few large producers characterize it. However, this does not rule out 
problems associated with firms that go out of business whenever there is a policy change; 
this is a weakness that cannot be addressed because of resource constraints and the 
difficulty of tracing former directors of a closed firm. A related question is whether to 
compare outcomes for treated firms to those of all firms that do not face a change in tax 
or firms that do not face a tax change yet are similar to the treated firms in capital 






To address concerns about the choice of the comparison group, I follow a 
technique used by Blundell et al. (2004) in a study that estimates the impact of a program 
that offers work incentives to young people between 18 and 24 years old on employment 
in the United Kingdom. I exploit the fact that the excise tax was for a small group of 
firms producing excisable goods and not all Ugandan firms. The availability of corporate 
returns data for all firms provides a large pool of untreated firms; a propensity score is 
then generated and used to identify untreated firms with similar covariates in   as the 
treated firms. Notably, a firm is not matched on every observable characteristic (capital 
structure, leverage, and payroll size) but instead on its propensity score. The propensity 
score helps to match treated firms to similar comparison group firms drawn from a pool 
of tax returns for firms that are not affected by the excise tax rates. This process ensures 
that the observed covariates of the treated and comparison group firms are similar. 
According to Blundell et al. (2004), this process balances the distribution of observed 
covariates in the treated and untreated firms before implementing the excise tax changes. 
The main objective of propensity score matching is to find a comparison group 
conditional on the observed firm-specific characteristics such as capital structure, 
leverage, and payroll size, which is more similar to treated firms. Note that propensity 
score matching requires that the treatment be statistically independent of the outcome 
variables of interest (firms’ sales revenue and profits) after conditioning on the 





multiple comparison group firms with the same propensity score. In the process of 
matching, there was no common support in the propensity score for 12,103 returns. These 
returns are dropped for the specification with matching. From the comparison group, 
there were 11,893 returns with no common support in the propensity scores, and 210 
returns for treated firm.         
 
Finally, changes in excise tax rates are expected to have an impact on excise tax 
revenues. If the objective of the tax change is to increase excise revenue, the effects 
might be positive. But if the goal of the policy change is to minimize the consumption of 
“sin” goods, then excise revenues may decrease as a result of the tax change. 
Unfortunately, firm-level data on the excise revenue payments by each firm were not 
available for the period under study. However, aggregated product-level data for both 
treated and untreated excisable products are available.  These data allow for the effect of 
changes in excise tax rates on excise tax revenue to be estimated. The estimation equation 
is:    
                               ∑     
 
   
                                    
where          is the log of excise tax revenue from product   at a time  ,   is a 
constant term,      is a common time trend which captures the effect of macroeconomic 
shocks that would affect excise tax revenues from both treated and untreated excisable 





    – One year after tax change, or t = 4 – Two years after tax change, and    which is 
a time-invariant dummy variable that equals 0 for excisable products whose tax rate did 
not change, 1 for those excisable products whose tax rates increased, and -1 if the tax 
rates decreased (Taxed products) for all time periods – this variable is the indicator for 
treatment. The product-level time-varying error term in Equation (2.12) is     and it 
captures unobserved time-varying factors that vary over excisable products. It is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with the variables in Equation (2.12). Notably, Equation (2.12) is 
similar to Equation (2.11) in that it relaxes the parallel trends assumptions and also 
allows the treatment effect to vary over time. The next section discusses the results.   
 
2. 6 Results and Discussion 
As discussed in the empirical strategy, this chapter aims to estimate the effect of 
changes in excise tax rates on firms’ sales revenue and profits, and also on the 
government’s excise tax revenue. The results from estimation of Equation (2.10) for sales 
revenue and profits are shown in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5, respectively.  Specification (1) 
shows results from a basic diff-in-diff without any controls but includes firm-level fixed 
effects that control for unobserved time-invariant firm-specific characteristics, a common 
time trend for both treated and comparison group firms, which captures the effect of 
macroeconomic shocks that would affect all firms’ sales revenue and profits in the same 
way, this specification also includes a year specific dummy variable for    , to control 





same way at that time. Specification (2) then adds firm-specific time-varying observable 
variables such as capital structure, leverage, and payroll size, which describe the nature of 
a firm and how it evolves over time.  Specification (3) shows results for treated firms that 
are matched on the covariates to comparison group firms, this specification’s effects are 
for taxed firms for which similar untaxed firms, in terms of capital structure, leverage, 




Table 2.4: The Effect of the Change in Excise Tax Rates on Firm Sales Revenue 
 Log sales revenue 
 (1) (2) (3) 








Controls No Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy variable for t=4 Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Matching on covariates  No No Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Observations 60,838 60,838 48,735 
R-squared 0.043 0.177 0.168 
Number of clusters 26,798 26,798 17,953 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at a firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables are log depreciation 
expense, log financial expenses, and log employee compensation; these variables describe a firm’s nature 
and they vary both across time and across firms; the control variables are used to generate the propensity 
score that is used for matching in specification (3).        
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 From the matching process, there were no matches for 210 treated firms (2 percent of the unmatched 
returns). From the comparison group, there were 11,893 firms (98 percent of the unmatched returns) that 
could not be matched to any treated firm. The matching process was based on a propensity score generated 
using firm-specific observable characteristics before the tax change such as capital structure, leverage, and 





Specifications (1) of Table 2.4 shows that treated firms experienced a decrease in 
sales revenue of about 8.3 percent relative to the comparison group. The result is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Adding time-varying firm-specific control 
variables, results in a marginally smaller effect of the change in excise tax rates on firms’ 
sales revenue relative to the results in Specification (1). Specification (2) shows this 
result, which suggests that firms that face an increase in excise tax rates experienced a 6.4 
percent decrease in sales revenue relative to the comparison group firms.  Matching on 
covariates preserves the sign of the effect of an increase in the excise tax on firms’ sales 
revenue, though the magnitude (-5.8 percent) is slightly smaller. This result is shown in 
specification (3); it suggests that the treated firms experienced a 5.8 percent decrease in 
sales revenue relative to the comparison group firms. The result is significant at the 5 
percent level, even though matching results in a 19.9 percent decrease in the sample size, 
from 60,838 to 48,735 observations. The sample size is still large enough to generate 
enough statistical power to minimize the likelihood of committing a type two statistical 
error. The benefit from matching is to improve balance on covariates between treated and 
comparison group firms prior to the change in excise tax rates.  
 
The preferred estimate in Table 2.4 is specification (2). It provides evidence that 
the change in the excise tax rates in Uganda in Fiscal Years 2015/16 and 2016/17 had a 
statistically significant negative effect on the treated firms’ sales revenue of 6.4 percent 





trends assumption holds and that the effect of the increase in excise tax rates on firms’ 
sales revenue is constant over time.  
 
Table 2.5 shows the effects of excise tax rate increases on firm profits, using the 
same specifications as in Table 2.4. The estimates for specification (1) of Table 2.5 
indicate that treated firms experienced a 30.1 percent decrease in firm profits relative to 
comparison group firms; this result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 2.5: The Effect of the Change in Excise Tax Rates on Firm Profits 
 Log gross profits 
 (1) (2) (3) 








Controls No Yes Yes 
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy variable for t=4 Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Matching on covariates  No No Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Observations 60,838 60,838 48,735 
R-squared 0.003 0.025 0.024 
Number of clusters 26,798 26,798 17,953 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at a firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables are log depreciation 
expense, log financial expenses, and log employee compensation; these variables describe a firm’s nature 
and they vary both across time and across firms; the control variables are used to generate the propensity 






Taking into account time-varying observable firm-specific characteristics in 
specification (2) of Table 2.5 slightly reduces the effect of the increase in the excise tax 
on firm profits by 2.9 percentage points relative to specification (1). The result in 
specification (2) shows that treated firms experienced a 27.2 percent decrease in firm 
profits relative to comparison group firms; this result is significant at the 5 percent level 
and it is the preferred estimate in Table 2.5.  After finding matches for treated firms from 
a large pool of untreated firms, the absolute value of the estimated effect of the tax 
change on firms’ profits marginally decreased by 0.4 percentage points in magnitude to 
26.8 percent, as shown in specification (3).  This result shows that the treated firms 
experience a 26.8 percent decrease in firm profits relative to the comparison group firms, 
even with the 19.9 percent decrease in the sample size, the result is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
It should be noted that an excise tax is not a tax on profits but instead on a firm’s 
output. Its imposition will have an indirect effect on firm profits. This effect could be 
quite large, on average. Based on the results discussed above, the reported decrease in 
sales revenue and, consequently, in profits of the taxed firms are relatively large for firms 
that face increases in the excise tax rates. Such effects should not be ignored by Ugandan 
tax policymakers, who widened the scope of the excise taxes beyond the traditional ‘sin’ 
goods to include goods whose consumption has no associated negative externalities. The 





assumption does not hold, and any policy conclusions based on the results should be 
interpreted cautiously, yet they might still offer an insight in the direction of the effect of 
the changes in tax rates on firms’ sale revenues and profits. Overall, caution is needed 
because the results may be biased and as such may not be conclusive as a guide to 
changes in tax policy.   
 
The results discussed above are the average treatment effects on the treated firms 
assuming that treated and control group firms have parallel trends, and that the treatment 
effect is constant over time. To test the parallel trends assumption, equation (2.10) is re-
estimated. But, the indicator for treatment is an interaction term of the time periods pre-
tax change and the indicator for taxed goods. If there were other things apart from the tax 
change, causing the sales revenue and profits to differ significantly between firms whose 
taxes increased and firms whose taxes did not increase, they would show significant 
effects in periods before the tax changes. The results for this test are in Table 2.6. For 
both total sales revenue and profits the treatment indicator has no significant effect on 
both firms’ sales and profits before changes in excise tax rates. This evidence suggests 







Table 2.6: Checking for the Effect of the Tax Before the Excise Tax Changes 
 (1) (2) 
 Log total gross sales Log gross profits 
















Observations 27,232 27,232 
R-squared 0.130 0.016 
Number of clusters 17,954 17,954 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at a firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables are log depreciation 
expense, log financial expenses, and log employee compensation; these variables describe a firm’s nature 
and they vary both across time and across firms; 
 
Given the results in Table 2.6, the expectation is that graphical evidence should 





Figure 2.2: Trends in Firms’ Sales Revenue and Gross Profit 
 
Figure 2.2 is a graph of the averages of the outcome variables (firms’ sales revenue and gross profits) for 
treated and comparison group firms over the period under study. The bars around the point estimates are 95 
percent confidence intervals.   
 
However, Figure 2.2 suggests that the parallel trends assumption might be 
violated since the changes in firms’ sales revenue and profits for treated and comparison 
group firms seem to be different pre-tax change. The mixed results suggest that, even 
though there are differences in the changes in the outcome variables (firms’ sales revenue 
and profits) between the treated and comparison group firms pre-tax change, these 
differences might not be statistically significant. This does not in any way suggest that 
the challenges posed to the DID estimation technique in identifying a causal effect of the 





results in specification (2) of Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 will be biased if the parallel trends 
assumption does not hold.        
 
Since the parallel trends assumption might be violated, Glewwe and Todd (2021) 
suggest that, with four time periods, two before the tax change and two after the tax 
change, a linear non-parallel time trend can be allowed, and the impact of the policy 
change can be allowed to be different at different periods.  
 
The results discussed earlier assume that the tax effect is constant on average in 
the two periods of post-tax change. But this is unlikely because over time, firms may 
learn to cope with the tax change by accessing markets that they did not reach before to 
increase their sales revenue. If this is the case, then the tax change may have a relatively 
smaller effect in the second period after the tax change. Assuming that businesses 
become more aggressive in discovering new within-country markets for their products, 
the impact of the increase in the excise tax on firm profits will also be smaller in later 
years. On the other hand, firms might substitute production away from goods with 
increased tax rates to un-taxed goods, consumer preferences in favor of the new 
substitutes might adjust slowly over time, and this could lead to a much lower effect of 
the tax change on firms’ sales revenue and profits in the second year after tax change.    





To allow for a linear non-parallel trend and test firms’ responses to the tax, 
Equation (2.11) is estimated for both firm sales and profits. The results are shown in 
Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7: Effects of a Change in Excise Tax Rates on Firm Sales Revenue and 
Profits in the First and Second Years After the Tax Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log sales revenue Log gross profits 
Taxed firms * One year after tax change 









Taxed firms * Two years after tax change 









Time Trend 0.072*** 0.087*** 0.044** 0.059*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.021) (0.021) 
Taxed firms * Time Trend 0.046* 0.032 0.104 0.105 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.121) (0.120) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy variable for t=4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matching on covariates No Yes No Yes 
Observations 60,838 48,735 60,838 48,735 
R-squared 0.177 0.168 0.025 0.024 
Number of cluster 26,798 17,953 26,798 17,953 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at a firm level: ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables are log depreciation 
expense, log financial expenses, and log employee compensation; these variables describe a firm’s nature 
and they vary both across time and across firms; the control variables are used to generate the propensity 
score that is used for matching in specifications (2) and (4).   
 
 
Specifications (1) and (2) show the excise tax’s effect on firms’ sales revenues without 





after tax increase (t=3) and two years after tax increase (t=4).  The sales revenues of firms 
that faced a tax increase decreased by 11.3 percent one year after the tax change, relative 
to the comparison group firms. Matching on covariates results in an almost identical 
effect in specification (2) of 11.2 percent. These results are both statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. In the second year post-tax increase, treated firms’ sales revenue 
decreases by 20.1 percent without matching on covariates; with matching on covariates, 
sales revenue for treated firms decrease by 13 percent relative to comparison group firms, 
and these result are statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, 
respectively. Testing the equality of the effects at t = 3 and t = 4 in specifications (1) and 
(2) results in F-stats of 5.4 and 4.7, respectively. The F-stats both have p-values smaller 
than 0.05. These results imply that the impact of the excise tax on firms’ sales revenue is 
most severe during the second year of the tax increase. 
 
The first (t=3) and second-year (t=4) effects of the tax increase on firm profits are 
presented in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 2.7. Specification (3) is without matching 
while specification (4) matches on covariates.  One year post-tax increase, the profits of 
treated firms decreased by 36.4 percent relative to the profits of the comparison group 
firms. Matching on covariates marginally increases the effect by 0.6 percentage points to 
37.0 percent. These results are both statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. 
Two years after the tax increase, the profits of the treated firms decreased by 61.1 percent 





percentage points smaller, at 59.6 percent. These results are both significant only at the 
10 percent level. These results suggest that an increase in excise tax rates will 
significantly reduce firm profits even two years after implementing the tax. Matching on 
covariates, which arguably improves balance in the distribution of these covariates 
between the treated and comparison group firms before the tax increase, does not change 
the magnitude of the estimates very much even though the sample size decreases 
significantly. These results suggest that the effect of the tax increases on firms’ sales 
revenue and profits is robust to the choice of the comparison group.  
 
Recall that the results in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 impose the parallel trends 
assumption and assume that the treatment effect is constant over time. But comparing 
first and second-year effects in specification (1) of Table 2.7 reveals that the treatment 
effect differs in the first and second-year post-tax implementation. In addition, the 
coefficient on the variable that allows for non-parallel trends between treated and 
comparison group is statistically significant at the 10 percent, which suggests that there 
might be non-parallel time trends in firms’ sales revenue. It is, therefore, reasonable to 
relax the parallel trends assumption and allow for the treatment effect to differ over time 
for the effect of increases in excise tax on firms’ revenue. The results in specification (1) 






In contrast, the first and second-year effects of the increase in the excise tax on 
firm profits in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 2.7 are not statistically significantly 
different from each other. This implies that it might be reasonable to assume that the 
treatment effect for firm profits is constant over time. In addition, the coefficient on the 
variable that allows for non-parallel trends between treated and comparison group is not 
statistically significant, which suggests that the parallel trends assumption might hold. 
Therefore, the results in specification (2) of Table 2.5 would be “preferred” for the effect 
of the increase in excise tax on firm profits.   
   
Even with advance notice,
13
 it appears that firms cannot generate short-term 
strategies to minimize the impact of the increase in the excise tax on either sales revenue 
or profits. If they put in place such actions, their effects do not materialize in the first two 
years after the tax has been implemented. Advance notice might take away the element of 
surprise of a tax that is still used in many tax jurisdictions. Yet, for the excise tax, which 
is a tax on a firm’s output, firms cannot immediately change their behavior to avoid or 
mitigate the impact of the tax on their sales revenue and profits. This suggests that 
changing production plans may take longer than three months.  
 
Recall that the objectives for imposing some of these excise taxes in Uganda 
include both raising tax revenue to meet government expenditure and limiting 
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consumption of the so-called “sin” goods. Given that the effects on firm sales revenue 
and profits are arguably large, it is important to examine what happened to tax revenue 
from taxed firms when the tax rates were increased. On average, excise taxes account for 
about 10 percent of the total revenue collected by the Uganda Revenue Authority. Before 
the tax change, excise revenues registered a year-on-year growth of 19.7 percent in FY 
2014/15, the year-on-year growth was marginally negative at 0.9 percent in FY 2015/16, 
the year when the rates were increased. Notice that excise revenues on average did not 
grow at all. The negative growth rates suggest that some of the excisable products must 
have performed below the expected tax revenues. Unfortunately, excise tax revenue data 
are not available at a firm level, but there are monthly product-level data with enough 
variation to estimate the relationship between excise taxes and government revenues for 
the period under study.   
 
The results from Equation (2.12) are shown in Table 2.8. Specification (1) 
imposes the parallel trends assumption and assumes that the treatment effect is constant 










Table 2.8: Effects of the Change in Excise Tax Rates on Tax Revenue 
 Log excise tax revenue 
 (1) (2) 
Taxed products * Fiscal Year 2015/16 -0.831*** 
(0.256) 
 
Taxed products * One year after tax change (t=3)    -0.642* 
(0.343) 
Taxed products * Two years after tax change (t=4)    -0.898** 
(0.395) 
Taxed products  * Time trend   0.132 
(0.297) 
Time trend  Yes Yes 
Observations 400 400 
R-squared 0.040 0.042 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. All specifications include a constant term 
 
Specification (2) allows for linear non-parallel trends and for the treatment effect 
to vary over the years. From specification (1), the tax revenue from treated excisable 
goods was about 83.1 percent lower than the tax revenue from excisables whose tax rates 
remained unchanged. This result is significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Figure 2.3 provides suggestive evidence that the parallel trends assumption might 
not be violated. The results that allow for a non-parallel linear trend are shown in 
specification (2). The coefficient on the interaction term between “Taxed products” and 
the “Time trend”, which is the test of parallel trends assumption, is not statistically 





Figure 2.3: Trends in Excise Tax Revenue 
Figure 2.3 is a graph of the averages of excise tax revenue from treated and comparison group goods over 
the period under study. The bars around the point estimates are 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
Nonetheless, in the first year after the tax increase, excise tax revenue from treated 
products decreased by 64.2 percent, this result is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. In the second year post-tax increase, tax revenues from treated goods were 89.8 
percent less than those from untreated excisables. This result is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. The decrease in excise tax revenues from treated relative to the 
untreated excisable goods buttress the earlier results on the effect of the tax increase on 
firms’ sales revenue and profits. However, to understand the large decrease in 
government tax revenues, a detailed breakdown of the excise tax revenues reported by the 





contradictory results. Table 2.13 in fact shows that overall, after the tax increase, excise 
tax revenues increased by 29.8 percent; it could be that the decrease in tax revenue from 
the taxed products was offset by the growth from the untaxed products. Nonetheless, 
conclusions drawn in the next sections of this chapter, which are based on one dataset, 
should be treated with the appropriate caution. Reconciling the differences in these data is 
an area that is being explored for future research.     
 
Compared to the comparison group firms, treated firms’ sales revenues and profits 
decreased by a magnitude of about 20.9 percent and 67.6 percent, respectively, over the 
two years post-tax increase. It would therefore be difficult to expect any tax revenue 
gains from the increase in excise tax rates. If it is indeed true that firms’ sales revenue 
decreased due to the tax increase, it must be the case that household spending on these 
excisable items decreased over that period. According to Uganda’s National Household 
Survey of Fiscal Year 2016/17, monthly household spending on alcoholic beverages, 
tobacco, and narcotics – which cover most excisable goods – decreased by 40 percent; 
from a share of 2 percent in monthly household expenditure in the Fiscal Year 2012/13 to 
1.2 percent in the Fiscal Year 2016/17. This timeframe covers the tax reform period. 
These alternative statistics, therefore, provide suggestive evidence that supports the 






The results further suggest that the Ugandan government might not have 
registered any gains in tax revenue from the increases in excise tax rates implemented in 
the fiscal year 2015/16. If the objective was to reduce consumption at the expense of tax 
revenue, the results suggest that this aim was achieved. However, it would be surprising 
for a country with a low revenue relative to its GDP, and a stagnated tax to GDP ratio, to 
focus on reducing consumption of “sin” goods instead of increasing the revenue: If the 
objective is increasing revenue, as discussions with the officials from the Ministry of 
Finance suggest, then the excise tax increases in FY2015/16 did not have a positive 
impact on tax revenues. The government must have increased tax rates in FY2015/16 
beyond the point where it can expect positive revenue gains. In other words, the increases 
in tax rates led to new rates that well above the optimal tax rates, which consequently 
resulted in lower tax revenues. 
 
The other possible explanation is that treated firms might have the ability to shift 
their production to other excisable products that did not face a tax rate change. This not 
only minimizes the effect of the tax on firms’ profits but also reduces the amount of tax 
revenue collected from treated products. The data discussed earlier in this section 
suggested that in FY2015/16, 15 treated firms exited and another 166 exited the 
following financial year, on the other hand, the comparison group firms increased by 
3,339 in the FY2015/16 and another 382 in the following financial year. These data 





production that does not attract an excise tax, which might partly explain the significant 
decrease in government tax revenues. For firms that cannot substitute their production 
because they do not produce close substitutes and do not have the resources to invent new 
products, they may choose a lower level output when they have advance notice that their 
tax rates will change as predicted by the theoretical model in the conceptual framework. 
This will also contribute to a decrease in government tax revenue. It is possible that other 
firms can underreport their sales and production figures if the probability of detecting 
such behavior by the tax authority is very low. This behavior is likely because tax stamps 
– a mechanism of tracing and verifying production and sales numbers – have been 
proposed recently only by the Ugandan government. The lack of a tracing tool makes it 
difficult for the tax authority to verify the reported production and sales figures. In a tax 
system based on voluntary compliance, tax audits are critical to ensure that businesses 
report the accurate figures, which is a potential area for future research. However, with 
no precise verification mechanism, firms are likely to underreport their production and 
sales figures because the probability of detection is very low. This eventually results in 
lower, perhaps much lower, revenue when the tax rates are increased.  
 
Underreporting may undermine the credibility of the estimates of firm behavior  
in this chapter, to alleviate some of these fears, section 5 of the Excise Duty Act of 2014, 
gives power to the Commissioner General of Uganda Revenue Authority to license 





taxpayer is not compliant. This legal provision gives the tax authority some leverage to 
compel the taxpayers to correctly report production and sales numbers. Nonetheless, 
underreporting will bias the results in this chapter away from zero; this implies that the 
(absolute value of the) effects of the increase in excise tax rates on firms’ sales revenue 
and profits will be overestimated.     
 
In addition, tax policy can ease the tax administrative burden by imposing a single 
tax rate for closely related products such as soft-cup and hinge-lid cigarettes or beer made 
from locally sourced raw materials and malt beer. Such improvements from the tax policy 
front may mitigate some of the negative effects on tax revenue that result from firms’ 
ability to substitute production to avoid the tax. The next section provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
It is a broadly accepted concept that imposing taxes that are not lump-sum 
generates a certain amount of deadweight loss. In most developing countries, tax 
policymakers’ goal is to raise sufficient revenue to meet government expenditure needs 
while causing as minimal distortions to firms’ operations as possible. This chapter’s main 
objective was to estimate the impact of increases in excise tax rates on firms’ sales 





the increases in excise tax rates in FY2015/16 resulted in an 11 percent and 20 percent 
decrease in firms’ sales revenues for treated firms relative to comparison group firms in 
the first and second-year post-tax increase, respectively. Firm profits for treated firms 
also decreased by 27 percent relative to comparison group post-tax increase. With these 
arguably large declines in sales revenue and profits, the findings suggest that tax revenues 
from products whose tax rates were increased were 83 percent lower compared to 
excisables whose tax rates did not change. These results suggest that while policymakers 
might increase tax rates with the view of generating more tax revenue to finance budget 
deficits, the tax rates in Uganda might have been increased beyond what is optimal. In 
addition to not generating the intended tax revenue, firms tend to experience significant 
decreases in sales revenue and profits. Given that the magnitude of the effects of the 
excise tax changes on firm sales revenue and profits, and negative effects on government 
tax revenue, tax policymakers in Uganda should think about the optimality of the tax 
rates imposed on excisable goods 
 
Note that excise taxes contribute only about 10 percent of the total tax revenue 
collected in Uganda. Changes in tax rates of the major contributors to tax revenue in 
Uganda, such as the Value Added Tax or Personal Income Tax rates, would have a larger 
effect on both firms’ sales revenue and government tax revenues. Underreporting by 
firms to avoid tax payments is still problem that most tax authorities have to address, 





introduces bias in estimates that are based on the underreported data, which might result 
in misleading policy recommendations. Finally, mechanisms to track and trace 
production and sales declarations of excisable goods have recently been implemented in 
Uganda, providing options for further research into how firms might respond to tax 








Table 2.9: Summary Statistics and Descriptions of Key Variables 




Min Max Observations 
Log Gross Profit The log of a firm's accounting profits, this is the difference 
between the sales revenue and cost of goods sold 
overall 17.637 3.656 0 27.994 N =   60838 
 between  3.201 0 27.914 n =   26798 
  within 
  2.072 -0.839 33.583  
Log Sales Revenue The log of sales revenue generated by firms from the sale of 
goods and services. 
overall 19.365 2.111 0.693 28.237 N =   60838 
 between  1.983 9.643 27.920 n =   26798 
  within   0.517 7.268 25.589  
Log Depreciation 
Allowance 
The variable captures the loss in value of capital equipment (wear 
and tear) at the end of every fiscal year. This variable shows the 
firm's capital structure, a firm that is capital intensive will have 
higher depreciation allowance. 
overall 
11.494 7.106 0 25.845 N =   60838 
 between  6.929 0 25.622 n =   26798 
  within 
  2.843 -7.785 27.394  
Log Financial Expenses This variable captures expenses of a financial nature incurred in 
generating income, such as bank charges, interest payments, 
insurance, exchange rate losses and provision for bad debts. The 
variable captures the leverage of a firm. 
overall 12.047 6.117 0 26.968 N =   60838 
 between  5.966 0 25.599 n =   26798 
  within   2.394 -4.579 30.662  
Log Employee 
Compensation 
This variable captures the payroll size of a firm  
overall 
16.590 1.892 0 25.676 N =   60838 
 between  1.767 0 25.584 n =   26798 
  within   0.520 -0.150 26.113  





 a change in the excise tax rate and 0 otherwise between  0.238 0 1 n =   26798 
  within   0.000 0.073 0.073  
After Fiscal Year 2015/16 This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 for years after 
FY201516, a financial year when excise tax rates were changed 
overall 0.552 0.497 0 1 N =   60838 
 between  0.367 0 1 n =   26798 
  within   0.405 -0.248 1.302  
Time This variable is a common time trend that takes on values 0,1, 2 
and 3 for Fiscal Years  2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17, 
respectively. 
overall 1.603 1.107 0 3 N =   60838 
 between  0.860 0 3 n =   26798 
  within   0.889 -0.397 3.403  
Log Excise Tax Revenue  This variable is the log of excise tax revenue that the 
Government of Uganda collects from all excisable goods  
overall 21.312 1.376 15.320 23.918 N =     400 
 between  1.949 16.829 23.343 n =      10 
  within   0.385 19.515 23.153  
The summary statistics include both the comparison and treated group data. These data are considered accurate by the Ugandan tax authority until a tax audit 
proves otherwise; the assumption is that these data are true record of firms’ economic activity Uganda. Notably, any errors in these data may greatly impact the 
results in this chapter. The firm-level data used in this study are from the Uganda Revenue Authority; restrictions apply to these data’s availability and are not 













Table 2.10: Summary Statistics and Descriptions of Key Variables after Matching on Covariates 
Variables Description    Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Observations 
Log Gross Profit The log of a firm's accounting profits, this is the difference 
between the sales revenue and cost of goods sold 
overall 17.774 3.685 0 27.994 N =   48735 
 between  3.153 0 27.914 n =   17953 
  within   2.215 -0.702 33.720  
Log Sales Revenue The log of sales revenue generated by firms from the sale of 
goods and services. 
overall 19.548 2.137 0.693 28.237 N =   48735 
 between  2.036 11.489 27.920 n =   17953 
  within   0.547 7.451 25.772 T-bar = 2.714 
Log Depreciation Allowance The variable captures the loss in value of capital equipment 
(wear and tear) at the end of every fiscal year. This variable 
shows the firm's capital structure, a firm that is capital 
intensive will have higher depreciation allowance. 
overall 11.933 6.920 0 25.845 N =   48735 
 between  6.585 0 25.622 n =   17953 
  within   3.035 -7.346 27.833  
Log Financial Expenses This variable captures expenses of a financial nature 
incurred in generating income, such as bank charges, 
interest payments, insurance, exchange rate losses and 
provision for bad debts. The variable captures the leverage 
of a firm. 
overall 12.560 5.903 0 26.968 N =   48735 
 between  5.608 0 25.599 n =   17953 
  within   2.523 -4.066 31.175  
Log Employee Compensation This variable captures the payroll size of a firm  overall 16.720 1.919 0 25.676 N =   48735 
 between  1.820 0 25.584 n =   17953 
  within   0.552 -0.020 25.644  
Taxes firms  This is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a firm 
faces a change in the excise tax rate and 0 otherwise 
overall 0.441 0.497 0 1 N =   48735 
 between  0.254 0 1 n =   17953 





After Fiscal Year 2015/16 This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 for years after 
FY201516, a financial year when excise tax rates were 
changed 
overall 0.087 0.282 0 1 N =   48735 
 between  0.275 0 1 n =   17953 





Table 2.11: Main results from Table 2.4, Table 2.5 and Table 2.7 with Bootstrapped 
Standard Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log sales revenue Log gross profit 
     





Taxed firms * One year after tax change 





Taxed firms * Two years after tax 

















Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy variable for t=4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matching on covariates No No No No 
Observations 60,838 60,838 60,838 60,838 
R-squared 0.177 0.177 0.025 0.025 
Number of clusters 26,798 26,798 26,798 26,798 
Bootstrapped errors in parentheses and are clustered at a firm level: ***, **, and * denote the significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The control variables are log depreciation expenses, log 

























Domestic          
Beer Yes 145.55 188.10 29.2% 
Cement  Yes 16.75 21.25 26.9% 
Confectionaries Yes - 0.77  
cigarettes  Yes 14.62 11.78 -19.4% 
furniture Yes - 0.14  
Sugar No 12.57 29.33 133.3% 
perfumes and cosmetics  No 7.95 8.74 10.0% 
Drinking water No 9.29 14.02 50.9% 
Soft drinks (soda, 
juices) No 65.69 83.50 27.1% 
Spirits No 49.75 75.03 50.8% 
Imports       
 Fuels   Yes 1,091.00 1,496.28 37.1% 
 Beer  Yes 27.14 25.37 -6.5% 
 Wine   Yes 17.80 16.64 -6.5% 
 Un-denatured spirits  Yes 68.23 63.79 -6.5% 
 Cigars   Yes 53.98 50.47 -6.5% 
 Cosmetics and 
perfumes   No 9.05 8.46 -6.5% 
 water and soft drinks   No 4.73 4.42 -6.5% 
 Others    78.54 73.42 -6.5% 
 Total without fuels   581.62 675.21 16.1% 
 Total     1,672.62 2,171.48 29.8% 
Tax revenues for periods before tax change are averages for FY 2013/14 and FY2014/15, while tax 






Chapter 3  
 
Employment Growth and Firm Size in Uganda 
 




















In many countries, protectionist policies are mostly driven by the argument that 
new and small firms are vulnerable and prone to market exit under stiff competition, and 
that such firms are crucial for innovation and net employment growth. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, however, little is known about within-country relationships between employment 
growth, firm size, and age. The main goal of this chapter is to estimate how net 
employment growth varies with firm size while taking into account firm age and firm-
specific characteristics in Uganda. The estimates in this chapter are by no means causal 
but rather show an accounting process that identifies the category of firms that contribute 
the most to net employment growth. The main contribution is to guide the targeting of 
policy interventions by the Uganda government, whose causal effects can then be 
estimated.   
 
Uganda’s National Labor Force Survey (NLFS) for fiscal year 2016/17 estimates 
that Uganda at that time had a population of about 38 million people. The working age 
population (between the ages of 14 and 64 years) is estimated to be 19 million. In 
general, Uganda’s population is very young, with 56 percent of the population below the 
age of 17 years, which points to a sizeable increase in the labor force in the near future.  
The 2016/17 NLFS also estimates that the employed population at that time was about 9 
million, which implies that the employment to population ratio (proportion of the 





North African countries, such as Egypt (39%), which recently experienced a decline in 
the rate due to the effects of the global financial crisis and civil unrest (Assaad et al, 
2019).  
The NLFS data also indicate that of the 9 million people, about 12.1 percent are in 
formal employment while about 86 percent are employed informally. The majority of 
people in formal employment are in the services industry, followed by production and 
then agriculture. It is therefore important to point out that the analysis in this chapter is 
based on business income tax returns data that cover only formal private sector firms. 
This means that the main analysis covers only formal employment.
14
 Nonetheless, formal 
employment contributes significantly to tax revenue and is dominant in the tax and 
industrial development policies of most developing countries. 
 
In Uganda, small and medium-sized businesses tend to attract attention from 
policymakers because of their potential to absorb a growing labor force and in turn 
stimulate economic growth. This provides a platform for such firms to lobby the 
government aggressively for tax incentives or protectionist policies. Of course, decisions 
around these policies ought to be backed by evidence since very little is known about 
which firms contribute the most to net employment growth in developing countries; this 
further speaks to the importance of the analysis in this chapter.   
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 Data from five waves of the Uganda Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) Surveys, which 
include both formal and informal sector enterprises, are used to complement the analysis based on formal 





        The question of which firms create jobs has been explored to a great extent in 
developed economies, but very little is known in the developing world, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The recent findings from developed economies, especially the United 
States, suggest that firm size does not matter in determining employment growth after 
controlling for firm age. Nonetheless, the study points to the importance of young 
businesses and startups in job creation (Birch, 1987; Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 
1996; Cabral and Mata, 2003; Neumark et al. 2011; Haltiwanger et al. 2013). It is, 
however, unknown whether the conclusions in developed economies carry over to 
developing countries, and more specifically to Uganda. The evidence presented in this 
chapter makes a contribution that closes this gap. More specifically, this chapter presents 
strong evidence that employment growth increases with firm size in Uganda, even after 
controlling for firm age and other firm-specific characteristics such as main economic 
activity. Employment growth is highest for large young firms. This result is rather 
contrary to recent developed country evidence, as discussed by Haltiwanger et al. (2013), 
and suggests that their conclusions do not necessarily carry over to developing countries. 
In addition, there is strong evidence that employment growth decreases with firm age for 
Ugandan firms. This is consistent with theoretical predictions that inefficient firms tend 
to exit over time while productive firms that prevail tend to adopt new technologies and 
substitute labor with capital, hence lower employment growth as firms mature 





chapter, therefore, imply that policy incentives targeting mature firms are likely to have 
very little impact on employment growth.  
 
Uganda’s corporate income tax regime provides many tax exemptions, such as 
income from the export of 80 percent of finished consumer and capital goods (for at least 
10 years), and income from agro-processing. These exemptions may seem universal in 
that they should benefit firms of different sizes as long as they qualify, but to be able to 
add value and also export significant amounts of output, firms need to be relatively 
mature in terms of age. Moreover, such firms might also be destroying more jobs than 
they create. Despite large and mature firms being the major beneficiaries of such policy 
interventions, developing country evidence from Assaad, Kraft, and Yassin (2020) 
suggests that large Egyptian firms cannot generate sufficient jobs to absorb the excess 
labor supply. In addition, firms learn over time and may adopt a compensation strategy 
that is based on workers’ effort to improve productivity. In the process of rewarding 
effort, the less efficient workers will be replaced (Lazear, 2000; Kraft and Assaad, 2018), 
which implies that jobs are being created and destroyed in the process. If firms replace 
less productive workers with productive ones over time, then employment growth 
decreases as firms mature. This is indeed true for Ugandan firms, since the evidence in 






Additional evidence on the effect of firm size on employment growth in 
developing countries is largely based on cross-country evidence, which does not reveal 
the within-country heterogeneous effects. More specifically, Ayyagari et al. (2014) used 
the World Bank’s enterprise survey data from 104 countries and found that, while small 
firms have the smallest share of aggregate employment, they are responsible for the 
highest share of job creation. In contrast, the findings in this chapter suggest that even 
though large firms destroy many jobs, they are responsible for the largest share of job 
creation in Uganda.  
 
The literature on gross job flows uses the number of employees both to construct 
employment growth rates and to measure firm size (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 
1999; Haltiwanger et al. 2013 and Ayyagari et al. 2014). However, data on number of 
employees are not available in the business income tax returns dataset. For this reason, 
this chapter uses employee compensation data to construct employment growth rates and 
deciles of firm size.  It can be argued that high employee compensation may not 
necessarily mean that firms are hiring more workers, but rather paying higher wages to a 
few productive workers; Kraft and Assaad (2018) present evidence from Egypt which 
suggests that high wages may simply reflect an improvement in productivity and not 
necessarily an increase in employment. It should be noted, however, that employee 
compensation may be correlated with employment growth because the position of an 





It seems, therefore, that the growth rate of pay reflects a change in employment over a 
short period.  
 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows; Section 3.2 
presents a conceptual framework, Section 3.3 describes the data and provides descriptive 
statistics, Section 3.4 discusses the empirical framework, Section 3.5 presents the results, 
and then a conclusion is provided in section 3.6.  
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
The Employment-population ratio, which shows that the proportion of the 
working-age population that is employed, is always reverted to if unemployment and 
labor force participation rates send mixed signals of employment growth. The 









  where   is the size of the 
labor force (employed plus the unemployed (  ));   is the size of the working-age 
population; and    is the employed population.  
 
According to the “bathtub” model of unemployment (Hall, 1979), a change in 
unemployment can be written as                ; where         are the job 





unemployment because firms incur both hiring and firing costs, and also because 
individuals may delay accepting job offers with the hope of receiving better ones.  
 
However, if the number of people losing jobs equals the number of people finding 
them, which implies that                        
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Substituting the employment rate into the employment-population ratio, it can be 








   
). Since the size of the labor force as a proportion of the 
working-age population  (
 
 
)  does not change very often, I assume that over short periods 





   
). From this expression, changes in the employment-population ratio are 
determined by changes in the job finding and/or separation rates. An increase in the job-
finding rate will increase employment, while an increase in the job separation rate will 
decrease employment. Assuming that the working-age population is constant over short 
periods of time and that there are no other shocks to the labor market, the employment 
growth rate will depend on changes in both the job finding and separation rates.  
 
The government may put in place policies to provide incentives for job creation 
which may improve the job-finding rate and in turn affect employment growth. On the 





market, which over time may minimize job separation rates. Therefore, in the process of 
incentivizing job creation by governments (such as providing tax breaks) and improving 
matches by firms, employment growth may be altered. Theoretically, the parameters that 
change employment growth rates are clear. But, the question of which firms (small, large, 
young, or mature) are responsible for what employment growth rates (high or low) is an 
empirical one, and it is investigated in the next sections of this chapter. 
 
 
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The analysis in this chapter is based on a business income
15
 tax returns’ panel 
dataset from Uganda, averaging 12,197 returns per fiscal year for nine fiscal years (FY 
2009/10 to FY 2017/18).  Over these fiscal years, there are a total of 109,772 business 
income tax returns. About 60.8 percent (66,786) of the returns belong to firms that still 
exist, while about 39.2 percent belong to firms that have exited, of which 94.3 percent 
(40,534) returns are assigned to the small taxpayers' office within the tax authority; these 
are returns for small firms.  
 
                                                          
15
 Business income is defined under Section 18 of Uganda’s Income Tax Act Cap 340 to mean any income 
derived by a person in carrying on a business. A person is further defined to include an individual, a 
partnership, a trust, a company, a retirement fund, a government, a political subdivision of a government 
and set of listed institutions. As long as a person as defined by the Income Tax Act, files a tax return, this 
person’s data are included in the analysis.   
It should be noted that these data are non-public; they are from the electronic returns filed with the Uganda 
Revenue Authority, which is Uganda’s semi-autonomous agency responsible for tax collection. Data can, 





The business income tax returns dataset includes variables such as: gross sales, 
cost of goods sold, total employee compensation (payroll expenses of a firm), age of a 
firm (the time when a firm first registered for taxes), financial expenses, depreciation 
allowances, gross profits, corporate income tax expenses, an indicator of whether a firm 
is classified as large, medium or small by the tax authority, and economic activity/sector 
of a firm. Nonetheless, the key outcome variables are employment growth, job creation, 
and job destruction, which are constructed from total employee compensation. The key 
explanatory variables of interest are average firm size and age class of a firm, which are 
constructed using total employee compensation and firm age, respectively. The 
mechanics of how these variables are constructed is discussed in detail in the next 
paragraphs and/or sections.  
 
The literature on gross job flows uses the number of employees to construct 
employment growth rates (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1999; Haltiwanger et al. 2013 
and Ayyagari et al. 2014). However, the position of an employer in the overall wage 
distribution is unlikely to change over a short period of time. Thus, changes in employee 
compensation should reflect changes in employment. Firms annually report basic salary 
paid to employees and other employee compensation, such as contributions to social 
security, health insurance benefits, and bonuses. Including contributions to social security 
may reflect changes in the contribution rates, which is 15 percent in Uganda, with 10 





changed since the establishment of the National Social Security Fund in 1985 (NSSF Act. 
Cap. 222), so including these contributions does not affect (percentage) changes over 
time in employee compensation.  
 
In addition, bonus payments may reflect recent success in the firm and not 
changes in employment. However, not including bonus payments ignores small firms that 
do not have a pay structure but use bonus payments as a compensation mechanism for 
their employees. Total employee compensation will, therefore, capture changes in the 
payroll of a firm over the year, which is generally not used when the data on the number 
of employees are available as a measure of job creation or destruction. In particular, if a 
firm lays off a worker at the beginning of the year and hires another towards the end, the 
number of employees will remain the same for that year, which looks like no job was 
destroyed or created.  
 
In contrast, payroll expenses allow one to observe when firms spend less on 
wages and salaries for the months between laying off one worker and hiring another; 
which in a way makes the use of payroll expense a better measure for job creation and 
destruction. It should be noted that, if the difference between total employee 
compensation in period t and t-1 is greater than zero, jobs are created, else it is job 






Note that employee compensation data from tax returns are in nominal terms; this 
means that these data include the effects of both inflation and productivity growth. 
Ideally, compensation would be deflated by a wage index, but such an index is not 
available for Uganda. Instead, the Consumer Price Index is used to deflate the employee 
compensation data to minimize bias in employment growth, to avoid the growth rates 
being biased upwards in periods of positive inflation.                      
 
Another limitation to using payroll data is that these data capture only firms that 
file tax returns. Thus, jobs created/destroyed by firms that operate in the informal sector 
are not captured in the analysis; hence the results in this chapter are limited to formal 
firms and may not necessarily hold for informal sector firms. However, the vast majority 
of large firms are in the dataset, since they are easy to detect in a relatively small 
economy due to the aggressiveness of the tax administration. 
 
In addition, the penalties and interest that accrue from defaulting on taxes are 
relatively high in Uganda, which should compel businesses to comply and register for 
taxes. Much smaller firms that are typically sole proprietorships with one or two 
employees may successfully operate informally, but the focus in this chapter is only on 
the formal sector, where jobs pay higher wages. This does not in any way downplay the 
role of the informal sector in absorbing excess labor, since large firms may not have the 





Bureau of Statistics, with support from the World Bank, has conducted five waves of the 
Living Standards Measurement Study Survey, which is a household survey that provides 
some data on formal and informal enterprises of surveyed households. The survey is 
nationally representative, and the number of enterprises included in the survey per wave 
is in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 shows that most of the enterprises both formal and informal are have 
one employee per month. On average, 80 percent of all household enterprises do not have 
any employees. The LSMS data do not include the large formal sector firms (the tax 
returns data capture these) which are responsible for most of the formal employment 
growth in Uganda.  
 
Table 3.1: Number of Enterprises and Employees per Wave of the Living Standards 
Measurement Study (LSMS) Survey 
Fiscal year of 
survey  
Informal Sector Formal Sector 
Enterprises 
No. of monthly 
employees Enterprises 
No. of monthly 
employees 
2009/10 1,746 1,716 95 87 
2010/11 1,453 1,449 76 75 
2011/12 1,391 1,387 87 87 
2013/14 1,551 1,550 125 125 
2015/16 1,668 1,654 133 127 
Total  7,809 7,756 516 501 
An enterprise is said to be informal if it reported that it was not registered for either income taxes or value 
added taxes during the fiscal year of the survey. Note that only 20 percent (1,662) of the enterprises have 
complete records. The survey makes an effort to follow the same households in each survey year and some 





The complete records from the LSMS survey allow for the construction of the key 
variables of interest such as employment growth, job creation, job destruction, firm size 
as measured by the monthly number of employees in these data, and enterprise age.  Of 
the 1,662 enterprises with complete records used in the analysis, about 90 percent are 
informal, and 10 percent are formal. These data are used to check the robustness of the 
findings from business income tax returns data.       
 
From the tax returns data, total employee compensation is used to construct the 
average firm size, which is simply the average of total employee compensation between 
periods          . Constructing average size in this manner should be robust to changes 
in size as a result of changes in ownership since it captures actual changes in the level of 
economic activity that a firm is involved in (Haltiwanger et al. 2013). The average size is 
constructed for the 69.5 percent (76,315) of the returns that report some form of 
employee compensation. Dummy variables are then created which categorize firms into 
firm size quintiles; each quintile includes about 20 percent of the returns, with the 
smallest firms in the first quintiles and largest firms in the fifth quintile. To check the 
robustness of the findings in this chapter, firm gross income is also used to construct an 
alternative measure of firm size quintiles.    
 
The dataset also includes the date that a firm was first registered for taxes, which 





of companies in Uganda is assigned a tax identification number relatively quickly and is 
required to file a tax return at the end of that tax year, hence the date that a firm first 
registers for taxes closely approximates the year that a firm is incorporated.  
 
A firm is considered to have exited if a tax return is filed only for earlier fiscal 
years in the data. Since firms have a unique identifier, the tax returns can be traced over 
time, which makes it possible to observe a firm that does not file a return in subsequent 
years. Firms that file their first tax return in the latest year of data are likely to have been 
in operation for a couple of months during that tax year and they constitute firm births; 
effectively, such firms will have been in operation for less than a year and they are not 
included in the analysis. Firms between 1 and 10 years are referred to as young firms and 
firms above 10 years are considered to be mature firms. About 32.9 percent of the returns 
belong to mature firms and 58.6 percent to young firms, which indicates that the majority 
of Uganda’s firms have been in operation for less than 10 years. The rest of the firms are 
firm births.   
 
To further explore the data, the age of a firm is categorized into age classes; 
which are essentially used as dummy variables for the age of a firm. The age classes 
include; 0; 1 to 2; 3 to 5; 6 to 10; 11 to 15; and 16+ years: These age classes are meant to 
capture how employment growth changes as firm age. The distribution of firms by age 





Table 3.2: Distribution of Firms by Age Class and Quintiles of Firm Size for FY 
2017/18 




              
First  Second  Third  Fourth Fifth Total % 
0 8 7 8 13 11 47 0.4% 
1 to 2 318 317 301 213 100 1,249 9.7% 
3 to 5 812 805 874 767 492 3,750 29.1% 
6 to 10 686 712 784 898 772 3,852 29.9% 
11 to 15 158 193 249 377 411 1,388 10.8% 
16 + 348 366 415 537 937 2,603 20.2% 
Total 2,330 2,400 2,631 2,805 2,723 12,889   
Each row in Figure 3.2 above corresponds to an age class and each column a quintile of size. Each cell, 
therefore, shows the number of firms that correspond to a particular age class and size. The last column 
shows the share of firms in each class. 
 
Table 3.2 shows that the largest group of the firms (29.9%) had been in operation 
for 6 to 10 years by fiscal year 2017/18, which is the last year of study in dataset. About 
69.1 percent of the firms had been in operation for 10 years or less. It is also clear that 
20.2 percent of firms had been in operation for at least 16 years. These summary statistics 
suggest that majority of the firms in Uganda are young. If these firms survive long 
enough, they could potentially be the key to absorbing the young yet rapidly growing 
labor force in Uganda. The empirical strategy and construction of the employment 







3.4 Empirical Framework    
  In this chapter, the relationship between employment growth, firm size, and firm 
age is estimated following closely the approach used by Haltiwanger et al. (2013) in 
determining who creates jobs in the United States.  Ordinary Least Squares is used to 
estimate an all dummy variable model, that is, employment growth is regressed on 
dummies for firm size, age classes of a firm and the interaction between the two sets of 
dummies, industry-specific dummies are later added to assess whether the relationship 
persists. These all-dummy-variable models are said to be general regardless of the 
distribution of the dependent variable and tend to yield very similar conclusions with and 
without interaction terms of firm size and firm age, and controls for industry-specific 
characteristics (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Davis et al. 2010).  
The estimation equation is given by equation (3.1): 
                     ∑∑                
 
   
 
   
                         
where     is the employment growth rate for firm   at time  . It is constructed based on 
the approach of Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). It is referred to as the DHS 
growth rate and is now the standard in the literature on the analysis of firm dynamics 
(Haltiwanger et al. 2013).  The DHS growth rate is defined as;  
    
           
      





where         
 
 
            , which is the average size of firm   at time          
 , and 
               are the total employee compensation by firm   at time         
   respectively. The variable     is included in equation (3.1) as a vector of dummy 
variables for firm size.       is a vector of age class dummy variables for firm   at time  . 
            is a vector of interaction terms of firm size dummies  and age class dummies, 
and   is a vector of industry-specific dummy variables, that control for time-invariant 
industry specific characteristics. The error term for firm   at time  ,    , captures 
unobserved time-varying firm-level characteristics.  
 
From the way employment growth is constructed, regressing this variable on the 
average size measure will result in an inverse relationship which might be misleading, 
hence the adoption of an all dummy variable model approach (Davis, Haltiwanger, and 
Schuh, 1996; Neumark, Wall and Zhang, 2011). The DHS growth rate is referred to as 
the standard measure in the literature since it accommodates firm entry and exit and 
captures “pure” growth in firm employment and not changes in the payroll resulting from 
mergers and acquisitions. In addition, firm size dummies are based on the average of total 
employee compensation between two periods, which is robust to temporary shocks to 
employment as compared to using compensation in either period, which is prone to bias 





alternative measure of firm size that uses gross income to construct firm size dummies is 
also based on two-year averages of gross income.  
  
One concern with how employment growth is constructed is that if the changes in 
employment have some random measurement errors in them, smaller firms will tend to 
have lower increases in employment than larger firms. This is because firms that 
randomly get assigned negative changes in employment will be somewhat smaller than 
those that randomly get assigned positive changes. This will occur even when no 
relationship exists between employment growth and firm size. A positive correlation 
between employment growth and firm size might be observed but purely because there is 
some random measurement error in changes in employment growth. One way to check 
whether the relationship between employment growth and firm size is not purely driven 
by measurement error is to define firm size only in terms of the  t-1 time periods. 
Therefore, equation (3.1) is re-estimated but with firm size defined in terms of the t-1 
time periods, that is              . The results from this robustness check are discussed 
later in the chapter.     
 
Equation (3.1) is also estimated separately for firms that are in wholesale and 
retail trade, accommodation and food service activities, construction, and financial and 
insurance activities, in order to ascertain whether similar patterns are observed in these 





If the results from estimating equation (3.1) show a pattern, then there must be a 
strong effect of firm size (total employee compensation and gross income) on 
employment growth. If employment growth increases with firm size, then it must be that 
more jobs are created by larger firms, even if they might destroy some jobs as well. The 
estimation equation to estimate the effect firm size on employment growth is given by 
equation (3.3):     
                                                                                               
 
where     is the employment growth for firm   at time  .      is total employee 
compensation for firm   at time  ;    is a vector of industry-specific dummies that control 
for time-invariant industry specific characteristics; and     is the residual for firm i at 
time t.  
 
    is a vector of time-varying firm specific characteristics that are correlated with 
the outcome variables of interest. The variables in     include: firm age; depreciation – 
which captures the capital intensity of firm, a higher depreciation allowance implies that 
a firm invests more in physical capital; financial expenses – which account for the 
leverage of a firm. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The process 
described above is repeated when employment growth is regressed on an alternative 
measure of firm size (gross income) to check for consistency of results across different 





to be estimates of causal relationships, but rather they measure the robustness of the 
correlation between employment growth and firm size. The next section of the chapter 
discusses results from the analysis. 
 
 
3.5 Results and Discussion  
3.5.1 Net Employment Growth and Firm Size 
Ordinary Least Squares is used to estimate equation (3.1). The results from this 
specification can best be interpreted using graphs. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the expected 
value of employment growth as the firm size category changes while holding constant 
firm age and its interaction with firm size. In addition, the relationship between 
employment growth and firm age, while holding constant firm size, is also explored (see 
Figure 3.4). Note that these relationships are not causal but rather an accounting process 
that shows which types of firms contribute most to employment growth in Uganda.      
 
Figure 3.1 presents three different specifications that show the expected value of 
employment growth for different firm sizes. Specification (1) is a regression of 
employment growth on firm size dummies, and then dummies for firm age are added as a 





firm age dummies, and industry-specific dummy variables are added in the specification 
(3).  
Figure 3.1: Employment Growth and Firm Size (Employee Compensation) 
 
Figure 3.1 shows how employment growth changes with firm size. Note that the first quintile has the 
smallest firms and the fifth has the largest firms. Employee compensation numbers are deflated using the 
Consumer Price Index. The bands are the 95 percent confidence intervals around each expected 







Figure 3.1 shows that, in the first quintile, employment growth averages at about 
3 percent in all specifications. Employment growth then increases by about 2 percentage 
points to an average of 5 percent in the second quintile. The rate then increases to 7 
percent and then 8.6 percent in the third and fourth quintiles respectively.  According to 
these deflated figures, employment growth peaks at 10 percent in specifications (2) and 
(3) and is highest in the fifth quintile.  
 
Given the observed employment growth rates in Figure 3.1, one can conclude that 
employment growth is positively correlated with firm size in Uganda; the correlation 
persists even after controlling for firm age and industry-specific time invariant 
characteristics. In fact, the correlation gets stronger after controlling for firm age. The 
results suggest that holding firm age constant, formal employment growth is highest in 
the largest firms in Uganda.  
  
To check the robustness of the above results to different measures of size, the 
firm’s gross income is used as an alternative measure of firm size, and the results are 
presented in Figure 3.2.  Figure 3.2 presents the same specifications as Figure 3.1 but 
using the alternative measure of firm size. Figure 3.2 shows that employment growth is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the first quintile, the rate is -
1.4 percent in specification (1) without any controls, increases in absolute terms to -1.65 





specification (3) – which includes interaction term for firm size and firm age dummies, 
and industry-specific dummies.  This result suggests that firms in the first quintile, which 
are the smallest firms, may not have a meaningful impact on formal employment growth, 
which is not very surprising. This is because firm-exit might be high among formal small 
firms in Uganda; that is, 94.3 percent (40,534) of tax returns for exited firms were from 
the small taxpayers’ office. Note that these firms might not necessarily shut down but 
rather operate informally.
16
   
Figure 3.2: Employment Growth and an Alternative Measure of Firm Size (Gross 
Income) 
 
Figure 3.2 shows how employment growth changes when quintiles of gross income are used as a measure 
for firm size. Specification (1) is a regression of employment growth on firm size dummies, then dummies 
for firm age are added as a control in the specification (2) and finally, an interaction term between firm size 
and age, and industry-specific dummies  are added in the specification (3). The first quintile has the 
smallest firms and the fifth has the largest firms. The bands are the 95 percent confidence intervals around 
each expected employment growth value. 
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 Later in this section of the chapter data from the Uganda Living Standards Measurement Surveys that 





Nonetheless, employment growth is on average, 3 percent in the second quintile, 
and this is significant at the 5 percent level. Employment growth then peaks in the fifth 
quintile at rates of 12.3 percent, 13.3 percent and 14.1 percent in specifications (1), (2), 
and (3), respectively. As in Figure 3.1, the results presented in Figure 3.2 show a positive 
correlation between employment growth and firm size. This positive correlation is robust 
to alternative measures of firm size in Uganda – supporting the earlier result that, holding 
firm age constant, the expected rate of employment growth is highest for large firms. 
 
To investigate the result further, specification (3) of both Figure 3.1 and Figure 
3.2 is estimated for select industries that have enough observations in the data to allow 
for industry-specific estimation.  These industries are construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, finance and insurance, and accommodation and food services.  
 
The results are presented in Figure 3.3, which again shows a positive relationship 
between employment growth and firm size. Firms in the first quintile, regardless of 
industry, register either negative employment growth or growth rates that are not 
statistically significant – this further supports the earlier result that small formal firms 
may not have a meaningful contribution to employment growth. The highest employment 
growth rates are registered by firms in the fifth quintile. Among the four industries 
examined, accommodation and food services, and construction have the highest growth 





contribute most to formal employment growth in Uganda.   In addition, the 
accommodation and food services sector and the construction sectors contribute the most 
to formal employment growth in Uganda.  
 
Figure 3.3: Employment Growth and Firm Size for select Industries with Quintiles 
of Size Constructed from both Employee Compensation and Gross Income 
 
Figure 3.3 above shows industry-specific results (at least for industries that the results could be estimated) 
of the relationship between employment growth and firm size. Employment growth (deflated) is regressed 
on quintiles of size and interaction with age class to generate the results plotted in this figure. In the graph 
to the left, employee compensation is used to construct quintiles of size, while the one on the right uses 
gross income (alternative measure). Firms in the finance and insurance sector may pay similar wages hence 
they end up in one quintile when employee compensation is as a measure of size. On the other hand, such 
firms are likely to differ in gross income, hence the classification in different quintiles when gross income 





 3.5.2 Net Employment Growth and Firm Age 
Jovanovic (1982) suggests that firms within a particular industry learn about their 
efficiency as they operate, and that the efficient firms survive while the inefficient fail 
and exit the industry. The learning process certainly happens over time, and firms 
become mature in the process. It is therefore possible that firms will start with relatively 
higher employment as they learn the operations within industry and over time downsize 
to an efficient level. To check this, I investigate how employment growth changes with 
firm age in Uganda.  
 
The results from this investigation are presented in Figure 3.4, where specification 
(1) is a regression of employment growth on firm age only, specification (2) adds firm 
size, and its interaction dummies with firm age, as controls, and finally, industry-specific 
dummies are added in specification (3).   
 
Figure 3.4 shows that employment growth decreases with firm age in all three 
specifications. Comparing firms that have been in operation for up to two years to those 
that have operated from three to five years, the decline is from as high as 40 percent in 
specifications (2) and (3) to about 16 percent, this is a decrease of about 24 percentage 
points. Employment growth then falls by 6 percentage points, to an average of 10 percent 
across the three specifications, for firms that have been in operation for up to 10 years. 





percent. Finally, firms that have been firms that are 16 or more years have the lowest 
unemployment growth rate, about 2 percent.  
Figure 3.4: Employment Growth and Firm Age 
 
Figure 3.4 shows how employment growth changes with firm age while holding other firm-specific 
characteristics constant. Specification (1) shows results without any controls, specification (2), includes 
controls for firm size and its interaction with age and specification (3) includes  industry-specific dummies 






The discussion above shows that the relationship between employment growth 
and firm age is negative for Ugandan formal sector firms. This implies that young firms 
have higher employment growth rates than mature firms. The relationship between 
employment growth and firm age also persists after controlling for firm size and time-
invariant industry-specific characteristics. These results are consistent with those for 
United States firms, and with the theory that firms tend to learn over time and inefficient 
firms that cannot keep up will exit. On the other hand, efficient firms tend to prevail and 
may adopt new technologies that allow them to substitute labor with capital, hence lower 
employment growth for mature firms (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992, Haltiwanger 
et al. 2013). 
 
The takeaway from the discussion above is that young firms may be vulnerable to 
exit if they are not efficient, regardless of size. Mature firms tend to have low and stable 
employment growth since over time they figure out their employment needs. Even 
though young firms – which most researchers and policymakers may mistake for small – 
have high employment growth numbers, these tend to decrease quite quickly as firms 
mature. It could be that firms become efficient and figure out their employment needs, 
but it is also likely that firms fail significantly and exit within the first five to ten years of 
operations. The overall conclusion of this analysis of employment growth, firm size and 
firm age for Ugandan formal firms is that formal employment growth is highest for large 





Figure 3.5: Employment Growth and Firm Age for select Industries with Quintiles 
of Size constructed from Employee Compensation 
 
Figure 3.5 above shows industry-specific results (at least for industries that the results could be estimated) 
of the relationship between employment growth and firm age. Employment growth (deflated) is regressed 
on firm age and its interaction with quintiles of size constructed from employee compensation (deflated). 
The number of observations per industry include; Construction (6,888); Wholesale and retail (26,653); 






Industry-specific relationships between employment growth and firm size are also 
investigated using deflated employee compensation, and the results are presented in 
Figure 3.5. The sectors that are investigated are: construction, wholesale and retail trade, 
finance and insurance, and accommodation and food services. In all four sectors, 
employment growth rate is highest for younger firms; the rates then decrease steeply for 
firms between 1 and 10 years of operation and tend to stabilize at lower rates for more 
mature firms. For construction, and for accommodation and food services industries, 
mature firms (10+ years) have an employment growth that is close to 0 percent and is not 
statistically significant. The wholesale and retail industry shows low and stable 
statistically significant employment growth rates for mature firms.  
 
Using gross income to control for firm size as opposed to employee compensation 
shows similar results – these results are presented in Figure 3.6. From the industry-
specific results, the negative relationship between employment growth and firm age 
observed in all formal Ugandan firms is also observed in selected sectors, such as 
construction, wholesale and retail trade, finance and insurance, and accommodation and 









Figure 3.6: Employment Growth and Firm Age for select Industries with Quintiles 
of Size Constructed from Gross Income 
 
Figure 3.6 above shows industry-specific results (at least for industries that the results could be estimated) 
of the relationship between employment growth and firm age. Employment growth (deflated) is regressed 
on firm age and its interaction with quintiles of size constructed from gross income. 





3.5.4 Additional Checks  
To check the robustness of the results from the all dummy variable specification, 
equation (3.3) is estimated. Specifically, employment growth is regressed on the log of 
employee compensation while controlling for firm age and other firm-specific 
characteristics as shown in panel A of Figure 3.4. Panel B shows results that use total 
gross income as a measure of firm size instead of employee compensation. If indeed the 
positive correlations discussed in the earlier sections of the chapter are robust, then an 
increase in either employee compensation or gross income should be associated with an 
increase in employment growth.  
 
In specification (1) of Table 3.3, employment growth is regressed on log 
employee compensation. Then, specification (2) controls such as firm age, depreciation 
(which captures the capital intensity of firm), financial expenses (which account for 
leverage). Finally, specification (3) adds year-specific dummies to account for macro-
economic shocks and industry-specific dummies to control for common within industry 
behavior regarding employee compensation. Panel A shows that employee compensation 
is positively correlated with employment growth. In particular, from specification (3), a 
10 percent increase in employee compensation is associated with a 0.9 percentage point 







Table 3.3: The effect of firm size and firm age on firm employment growth 
 Employment growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A:     
Log employee 
compensation 
0.059*** 0.084*** 0.091*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age of a firm in years  -0.013*** -0.014*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Log depreciation expense  -0.023*** -0.023*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Log financial expenses  -0.024*** -0.029*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.902*** -1.077*** -1.172*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.181) 









R-squared 0.038 0.064 0.073 
Panel B: Uses an alternative 
measure of size 
   
Log total gross income 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age of a firm in years  -0.010*** -0.011*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Log depreciation 
expense 
 0.004** 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Log financial expenses  -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.373*** -0.449*** -0.675*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.112) 
Year specific dummies No No Yes 
Industry-specific 
dummies 
No No Yes 
Observations 50,467 50,467 50,467 
R-squared 0.010 0.023 0.029 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Panel B has the same regressions as 





In addition, similar patterns can be observed in panel B, and specification (3) suggests 
that a 10 percent increase in a firm’s gross income is associated with a 0.36 percentage 
point increase in employment growth. Changes in both employee compensation and gross 
income capture changes in firm size, but employment growth may respond to these two 
measures differently, hence the difference in the magnitude of results. Finally, the 
coefficient on firm age is negative in both panels A and B, as expected. This shows that 
an increase in firm age is associated with a decrease in employment growth. Specifically, 
one more year of operation is, on average, associated with a decrease in employment 
growth by 0.01. The results discussed above further buttress the main findings in this 
chapter that employment growth increases with firm size and decreases with firm age for 
Ugandan firms.  
 
One concern with the figures discussed in earlier subsections is that if a 
distribution of firms of different sizes is randomly assigned increases and decreases in 
employment, there will be no relationship between firm size and changes in employment. 
However, the firms that randomly get assigned negative changes in employment will be 
somewhat smaller than those who randomly get assigned positive changes – since firm 
size is measured as the average of two consecutive years of employee compensation. This 
means that smaller firms will likely have lower increases in employment than larger 
firms, even when no relationship exists. A similar occurrence is likely if the changes in 





net employment are robust to this kind of behavior is to define firm size in terms of the  t-
1 time periods only. The results from this robustness check are in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7: Employment Growth and Firm Size with Size defined in terms of      
periods 
 
Figure 3.7 shows how employment growth changes when quintiles of employee compensation 
(specification (1)) and gross income (specification (2)) are used as a measure for firm size, with firm size 
defined in terms of      periods   The bands are the 95 percent confidence intervals around each expected 






The results from Figure 3.7 show a somewhat positive correlation between 
employment growth and firm, even when firm size is constructed in terms of the  t-1 time 
periods only. The results in both specifications suggest that employment growth between 
the first and third quintiles is about the same; there are increases in the fourth and fifth 
quintiles; however, the confidence intervals are wide in these two quintiles. Even though 
the positive correlations are not as strong as observed in the earlier figures, employment 
growth still shows an upward trend as firms increase in size.   
 
The results discussed so far in this chapter are based on data that cover all formal 
firms in Uganda. However, Uganda’s National Labor Force survey suggests that of the 19 
million Ugandans of the working-age population, only 12.1 percent are in formal 
employment, implying that the majority of the workers are employed informally. The 
results discussed earlier may be true for formal employment, but they may not necessarily 
hold when considering informal enterprises. To check if the earlier conclusions in this 
chapter hold while including informal sector firms, informal enterprise data are pooled 
from the nationally representative Uganda Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) 
survey. The outcome variable in this chapter (employment growth) is regressed on the 
average number of employees. At the same time, enterprise age and its interaction with 
enterprise-size are added as control variables. Finally, enterprise-level fixed effects are 
added to control for enterprise-specific time-invariant characteristics. The results are in 







Table 3.4: The Effect of Firm Size on Employment Growth using Living Standards 
Measurement Study Survey Data 
 (1) 
 Employment Growth 
  
Average number of employees (Enterprise size) 2.469*** 
 (0.520) 
Enterprise Age 0.055 
 (0.035) 





Enterprise level fixed effects  Yes 
Observations 1,662 
R-squared 0.630 
Number of clusters 1,061 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Enterprise size is constructed based 
on the Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) definition of size as the two year average of the monthly 
number of employees by each enterprise.. 
 
Table 3.4 shows that a 1 percent increase in enterprise size is associated with a 2.5 
percent increase in employment growth. The result is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. This result suggests that the largest informal and formal enterprises are 
likely to post the highest employment growth rates in Uganda. The finding also supports 
the main results in this chapter that employment growth increases with firm size in 







The main goal of this chapter was to explore how employment growth varies with 
firm size and age in a developing country context. Most of the analysis of employment 
growth and firm size had been focused on developed countries largely due to the limited 
availability of usable data from developing countries.  
The analysis in this chapter uses business income tax returns dataset from Uganda, the 
findings suggest that, contrary to what Haltiwanger et al. (2013) find for United States 
firms, employment growth rates increase with firm size, and the relationship persists even 
after controlling for age and firm-specific characteristics. In addition, the findings also 
suggest that employment growth decreases with firm age. This result is consistent with 
what Haltiwanger et al. (2013) find for U.S. firms. The main addition to the literature 
from this chapter is that formal employment growth is highest for large young firms, 
these firms also destroy the most jobs but they also create many more such that the net 
effect is positive.  
The positive correlation between employment growth and firm size is robust to 
alternative measures of firm size, and to the inclusion of informal sector firms in the 
analysis. Note that the findings in this chapter are not causal, but rather focus on 
measurement with the intent of shedding light on which firms contribute most to 
employment growth, create and destroy most jobs in Uganda. Finally, given the relatively 
high exit rate of firms, it might be worthwhile investigating the survival rates of firms in 
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